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ARTICLES 
LONGSTANDING AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS 
Anita S. Krishnakumar* 
 
How much deference—or what kind—should courts give to longstanding 
agency interpretations of statutes?  Surprisingly, courts and scholars lack a 
coherent answer to this question.  Legal scholars long have assumed that 
longstanding agency statutory interpretations are treated with heightened 
deference on judicial review, and federal courts sometimes have made 
statements suggesting that this is the case.  But in practice, federal court 
review of longstanding agency interpretations—at both the U.S. Supreme 
Court and courts of appeals—turns out to be surprisingly erratic.  
Reviewing courts sometimes note the longevity of an agency’s statutory 
interpretation as a plus factor in their deference analysis but at other times 
completely ignore or dismiss an agency interpretation’s longevity.  
Moreover, judicial rhetoric about the relevance of longevity in the review of 
agency statutory interpretations is inconsistent from case to case. 
What makes this doctrinal incoherence particularly remarkable is that 
courts usually care much more about the predictability of statutory 
interpretations and about upsetting settled institutional practices.  In fact, 
in two analogous contexts—judicial interpretations of statutes and 
historical executive branch practice in the constitutional arena—courts 
accord strong precedential effect, or a presumption of correctness, to 
established legal constructions.  This Article provides the first detailed 
study of federal court treatment of longstanding agency statutory 
interpretations, illuminating doctrinal inconsistencies and examining 
longevity-related factors that both favor and disfavor deference.  The 
Article also compares federal courts’ chaotic treatment of longstanding 
agency statutory interpretations with the precedential effect that courts give 
to longstanding judicial interpretations of statutes and the historical 
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“gloss” effect that courts give to past executive practice in constitutional 
interpretation.  Ultimately, the Article argues that longstanding agency 
interpretations of statutes are at least as deserving of heightened judicial 
deference and that, at a minimum, federal courts’ disparate treatment of 
such interpretations—without acknowledging or justifying the distinction—
is troubling.  The Article advocates that longstanding agency 
interpretations should be entitled to precedential effect by reviewing courts 
and outlines how such an approach might work. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Judges and commentators grapple endlessly with the appropriate 
standards for judicial review of agency statutory interpretations.  Courts 
have devised multiple tests1 and produced a list of myriad factors to weigh 
when evaluating agency interpretations,2 and legal scholars have debated 
 1. See, e.g., Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 
982 (2005); United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001); Auer v. Robbins, 
519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842–43 (1984); Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978); Bowles v. 
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).  For 
a discussion of the substance of these tests, see infra Part I.A and accompanying notes. 
 2. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140 (stating that deference to agency statutory 
interpretation depends on “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, [and] its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements”).  Later cases have 
added the formality of the agency’s procedure, the agency’s relative expertness, and the 
longevity or contemporaneousness of the interpretation to the list of so-called Skidmore 
factors. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004) 
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and dissected the nuances of these tests and factors almost incessantly.3  
But despite the considerable ink spent on this subject in the U.S. Reports 
and law reviews, an important interpretive question remains unexplored:  
how much deference—or what kind—should courts give to longstanding 
agency interpretations of statutes?  Surprisingly, courts and scholars lack a 
coherent theory for how to treat such longstanding agency interpretations.4  
In principle, virtually everyone seems to agree that longstanding agency 
statutory interpretations should be entitled to extra weight upon judicial 
review.  Legal scholars long have assumed that longevity matters a great 
deal in the judicial calculus of whether to uphold an agency statutory 
interpretation,5 and federal courts in some cases have made sweeping 
(longstanding); United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219 (2001) 
(contemporaneousness); Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (formality and relative expertness); 
Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 103 (1981) (longstanding practice). 
 3. For just a small sampling, see Kenneth A. Bamberger & Peter L. Strauss, Chevron’s 
Two Steps, 95 VA. L. REV. 611 (2009); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE 
L.J. 549 (2009); Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 
ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of 
Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Michael P. Healy, 
Reconciling Chevron, Mead, and the Review of Agency Discretion:  Source of Law and the 
Standards of Judicial Review, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2011); Kristin E. Hickman & 
Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1235 (2007); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 
969 (1992); Abner J. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 
AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1986); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath:  Judicial Review 
of Agency Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Connor N. 
Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron As a Canon, Not a Precedent:  An Empirical 
Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1727 
(2010); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 511; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:  Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking 
in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Kenneth W. 
Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 307–12 (1986); 
Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 
597 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
2071 (1990). 
 4. One previous article addresses the Supreme Court’s treatment of longstanding 
agency interpretations indirectly. See Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Deference, Agency 
Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1013 (2005).  The article argues that 
Chevron’s approval of agency flexibility to change interpretations over time confused 
judicial deference analysis by creating a clash between the competing values of interpretive 
consistency and flexibility and that Mead’s “force of law” test further complicates things. Id. 
at 1015–16.  The article advocates a commitment theory approach to Mead’s “force of law” 
inquiry, whereby courts afford “force of law” status to an interpretation when an agency 
commits to applying the interpretation consistently across time and parties. Id. at 1016–17. 
 5. Scholars have not examined judicial deference to longstanding agency 
interpretations in detail; rather, their assumptions rest on empirical studies showing that 
federal courts often reference the longevity of an agency’s interpretation in the course of 
upholding it.  In a seminal Yale Law Journal article about Chevron, for example, Professor 
Thomas Merrill noted that “the duration of an executive interpretation is the most frequently 
encountered factor in the pre-Chevron case law (and for that matter in the post-Chevron 
cases as well).” See Merrill, supra note 3, at 1019; see also, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:  Supreme Court Treatment of Agency 
Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1148–49 (2008) 
(reporting an agency win rate of 73.2 percent for longstanding and relatively stable 
interpretations, compared to an average win rate of 68.8 percent for all agency 
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statements indicating that longevity should factor significantly in the 
judicial review of an agency interpretation.6  But no one has explained why 
longstanding agency interpretations should receive heightened deference, or 
how exactly such heightened deference should work.  Moreover, once we 
look past the surface rhetoric and examine actual judicial practice, federal 
courts’ handling of longstanding agency interpretations proves to be 
startlingly unstructured.  Courts do sometimes note the longevity of an 
agency’s statutory interpretation as a plus factor in their overall deference 
analysis, but their talk is always loose—and worse—inconsistent from case 
to case. 
Consider the following four scenarios, all of which occur with some 
regularity in federal court review of longstanding agency interpretations:  
(1) the court mentions the longevity of an agency’s interpretation in 
passing, assigning no particular weight to it;7 (2) the court discusses the 
historical pedigree of a longstanding interpretation in detail and states that 
longstanding interpretations are worthy of “particular” or “great” 
deference;8 (3) the court completely ignores the fact that the agency 
interpretations and win rates for recent and evolving agency positions of 66.9 percent and 
60.5 percent); Raso & Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1781–82 (reporting a statistically significant 
correlation between a longstanding agency policy and the Supreme Court’s willingness to 
defer to the agency’s interpretation). 
 6. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004) (recognizing 
that the Court “will normally accord particular deference to longstanding agency 
interpretations” (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002))); Bragdon v. 
Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644–45 (1998); NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership 
Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 189–90 (1981); Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319, 
332 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is highly significant here that the agency’s ‘interpretation is one of 
long standing.’” (quoting Walton, 535 U.S. at 221)); Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 
98, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that agency’s “longstanding” interpretation was “entitled to a 
great deal of persuasive weight”); Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 289 
(3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts give ‘considerable weight’ to a ‘consistent and longstanding 
interpretation by the agency’ responsible for administering a statute.” (quoting Int’l Union of 
Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1106 (3d Cir. 
1980)). But see Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 488 (2011) (calling longevity “a slender 
reed to support a significant government policy” and arguing that “[a]rbitrary agency action 
becomes no less so by simple dint of repetition”). 
 7. See, e.g., Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012); Kasten v. 
Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011); Smith v. City of 
Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239–40 (2005); Morrison-Knudsen Const. Co. v. Dir., Office of 
Workers’ Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 635 (1983); Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 
F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004); Sec’y of Labor v. Excel Mining, LLC, 334 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. 
Cir. 2003).  For additional cases, see discussion infra Part I.A. 
 8. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 487 (“particular 
deference” (quoting Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 220)); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 
(1982) (“great deference”); United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 
719 (1975) (“considerable weight” but “not controlling”); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975) (“great respect”); Ramos-Barrientos v. 
Bland, 661 F.3d 587, 598 (11th Cir. 2011) (“particular deference” (quoting Alaska Dep’t of 
Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 487)); Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 262 (2d Cir. 
2009) (“substantially more deference” than other interpretations); United States v. 
Occidental Chem. Corp., 200 F.3d 143, 152 (3d Cir. 1999) (“must defer” unless agency’s 
interpretation is unreasonable).  For additional cases, see discussion infra Part I.A. 
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interpretation it is reviewing has been in place for years or even decades;9 
and (4) the court acknowledges the longevity of an agency’s interpretation 
but rejects the interpretation as unpersuasive.10 
Consider also the following scenario from a recent Roberts Court case:  
the Clean Water Act11 (CWA) requires landowners to obtain a permit 
before discharging certain materials into “navigable waters” and defines 
“navigable waters” as “waters of the United States.”12  The Army Corps of 
Engineers, the agency that administers the relevant sections of the CWA, 
had for thirty years interpreted “waters of the United States” expansively, to 
include “tributaries” and wetlands “adjacent” to navigable waters and had 
specified that “[w]etlands separated from other waters of the United States 
by man-made dikes” count as “adjacent wetlands.”13  John Rapanos 
backfilled three wetlands that bore a surface connection to man-made drains 
(or in one case a river) that emptied into other rivers—without obtaining a 
permit.14  When the agency brought an enforcement action against him, 
Rapanos challenged the validity of the Army Corps’ regulation.15  On 
judicial review, Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion rejected the agency’s 
longstanding interpretation of the statute and ruled in Rapanos’s favor.16  
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, 
chastised the plurality for displacing agency regulations that had been in 
effect for over thirty years.17  Two concurring opinions failed to mention 
the longevity of the agency’s interpretation at all.18 
What are regulated parties, members of the public, and agencies 
themselves to make of this inconsistent, fickle jurisprudence?  The upshot 
of the courts’ chaotic approach seems to be that the longevity of an 
agency’s interpretation matters, but not that much.  Settled agency practices 
are relevant, but not controlling.  What makes this doctrinal incoherence 
particularly remarkable is that courts usually care much more about the 
predictability of statutory interpretations and about upsetting settled 
institutional practices.  As Justice Brandeis once famously declared, “in 
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled 
 9. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870–71 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (pointing out that majority opinion ignores longevity).  For 
additional cases, see discussion infra Part I.B. 
 10. See, e.g., Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 
694 n.11 (1980); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 117 (1978); Se. Ala. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 
572 F.3d 912 (D.C. Cir. 2009).  For additional cases, see discussion infra Part I.C and 
accompanying notes. 
 11. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012). 
 12. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723–24 (2006) (citing 33 C.F.R. 
§§ 328.3(a)(1)–(3), (5), (7); 328.3(c)). 
 13. .Id. 
 14. Id. at 719–20. 
 15. Id. at 719. 
 16. Id. at 732–35, 738 (relying on dictionary definitions, the meaning given to similar 
terms in other statutes, the whole act rule, the constitutional avoidance canon, and a 
federalism clear statement rule). 
 17. Id. at 797, 799, 806–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 18. Id. at 759 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 811 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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than that it be settled right.  This is commonly true even where the error is a 
matter of serious concern, provided correction can be had by legislation.”19  
In other words, where the legislature has the power to correct mistakes—as 
it does with improper statutory interpretations, which can be overridden by 
legislative amendment—even incorrect statutory interpretations should be 
left alone.  And, indeed, when it comes to reexamining judicial 
interpretations of statutes, courts tend to be extremely deferential to 
established prior constructions. 
In fact, the general rule is that judicial interpretations of statutes, once 
rendered, enjoy heightened stare decisis effect, sometimes referred to as a 
“super-strong” presumption of correctness—particularly, although not only, 
if they are of longstanding vintage.20  Established executive branch 
practices similarly receive significant weight from courts reviewing the 
scope of executive power under the U.S. Constitution, rather than a 
statute.21  This heightened precedential effect for judicial constructions of 
statutes and executive constitutional interpretations is based on several 
theoretical premises, ranging from presumed legislative acquiescence to 
reliance interests to legitimacy concerns.22  The puzzling thing is that these 
theoretical premises apply at least equally, if not more so, to agency 
interpretations of statutes.  Yet no one seems to have noticed the courts’ 
disparate treatment of longstanding judicial versus agency statutory 
interpretations, or longstanding executive practice in constitutional versus 
statutory interpretation—or at least, no one seems to think the disparities 
are all that troublesome.23 
One reason for this disparate treatment may be that federal courts tend to 
view agency interpretations as the work of an inferior institution, rather 
than as legal precedents established by a coequal branch.  Perhaps as a 
result, courts tend to underplay the extent to which statutory interpretation 
involves policymaking choices that courts are ill-equipped to second-guess.  
Further, judicial review of agency statutory interpretations may reflect an 
underlying judicial bias toward maintaining control and discretion over the 
final determination of what a statute means.  Because of these institutional 
dynamics, courts reviewing longstanding agency interpretations tend to 
 19. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 20. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (“Considerations 
of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation.”); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (noting that 
statutory precedents “often enjoy a super-strong presumption of correctness”). 
 21. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text. 
 23. For one notable exception, see Harold M. Greenberg, Why Agency Interpretations of 
Ambiguous Statutes Should Be Subject to Stare Decisis, 79 TENN. L. REV. 573, 574–75 
(2012) (criticizing Chevron for allowing agencies to change their interpretations of 
ambiguous statutes over time and arguing instead for stare decisis effect that would bind 
agencies to stick with their initial interpretations).  The author seeks to constrain agencies’ 
interpretive flexibility, not to force greater deference from courts, and argues for stare decisis 
effect for all agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, not just longstanding ones. Id. at 
617–18. 
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focus on linguistic arguments and background interpretive presumptions 
rather than on the workability of the agency’s interpretation, the reliance 
interests it has created, or the extent to which it has become an established 
component of the regulatory framework.24  Longevity accordingly gets 
folded into—and often lost within—judicial wrangling over competing 
interpretive canons or other traditional tools of statutory construction.  But 
this seems wrong, or at least insufficient.  An agency interpretation that has 
been in place for years, directing both private and government behavior, 
and that has withstood executive and congressional oversight as well as the 
shifting political whims of several presidential administrations, is a 
precedent in its own right.  It has its own, independent claim to authority.  
As such, it deserves more than loose mention as merely one factor in a 
laundry list of considerations taken into account upon judicial review. 
The purpose of this Article is twofold:  First, it seeks to illuminate federal 
courts’ chaotic current treatment of longstanding agency statutory 
interpretations.  Second, it compares the courts’ inconclusive approach to 
reviewing established agency interpretations with their highly deferential 
approach toward established judicial interpretations of statutes and 
established executive practice in the constitutional context, and it argues 
that courts should accord greater systematic deference to longstanding 
agency interpretations of statutes as well.  Instead of the current haphazard 
approach, courts should adopt a rule providing that, where an agency 
interpretation has been in place for a significant period of time25 and has 
not been disturbed by Congress, the interpretation is entitled to some form 
of precedential effect. 
To be clear, this Article is concerned only with the judicial review of 
agencies’ longstanding legal interpretations of statutes, not with the review 
of agencies’ policy or factfinding decisions.  That is, the Article advocates 
presumptive judicial deference to longstanding agency constructions of 
statutory language; it does not address federal court review of agency action 
for “arbitrariness or capriciousness” or for the presence of “substantial 
evidence” supporting the agency’s factual findings.26 
The Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I examines federal courts’ 
muddled current approach to evaluating longstanding agency interpretations 
and the inconsistency that results.  Part II elaborates the theoretical 
assumptions that underlie the super-strong presumption of correctness for 
judicial interpretations of statutes and the historical “gloss” deference given 
to past executive practice in constitutional interpretation and argues that 
 24. See, e.g., infra notes 63, 78 and accompanying text. 
 25. The exact length of time can and should be open for discussion, perhaps something 
along the lines of ten years or more. 
 26. The “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review is a “catch-all” standard that 
applies to the judicial review of numerous agency activities, including the exercise of 
discretion and informal factfinding. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:  
CASES AND MATERIALS 127–28 (6th ed. 2011). “Substantial evidence” is a standard of 
review applied to agency factual determinations made in the context of formal hearings. See 
id. at 199.  Both standards are set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A), (E). 
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most of these assumptions operate at least equally, if not with greater force, 
in the context of longstanding agency interpretations of statutes.  Part III 
outlines a new approach to the judicial review of longstanding agency 
interpretations, advocating that such interpretations be entitled to 
precedential effect, subject to judicial overruling under only those limited 
circumstances that justify the overruling of ordinary judicial precedents.27 
I.   THE CURRENT DOCTRINAL MUDDLE 
Judicial doctrine regarding longstanding agency interpretations is a mess.  
Trapped somewhere between the recognition that an interpretation’s vintage 
should matter and the Supreme Court’s current deference regimes, federal 
courts have been markedly inconsistent in their evaluations of longstanding 
agency statutory interpretations.  This part uses several cases to illustrate 
the resulting doctrinal incoherence.  It is descriptive and foundational, 
deferring until Part II.D theoretical discussions about the reasons for the 
courts’ loose jurisprudence in this area. 
The methodology employed by this Article is not empirical; it does not 
examine every Supreme Court or federal court of appeals case decided 
within a certain time frame that involved a longstanding agency 
interpretation.  However, the Article’s analysis is based on review of over 
sixty-six such cases, including nearly forty Supreme Court cases and nearly 
thirty federal court of appeals cases.28  The cases discussed in this part thus 
offer a representative picture but are not comprehensive. 
Longstanding agency interpretations receive varying levels of deference 
from federal courts.  But there are three basic approaches that describe the 
overarching landscape.  First, courts sometimes treat the vintage of an 
agency interpretation as a loose plus factor that adds force to a construction 
reached primarily through other interpretive tools.  Second, courts 
sometimes completely ignore the fact that an agency interpretation has been 
in effect for years, while upholding it for other reasons.  Third, courts 
sometimes reject longstanding agency interpretations—either outright or 
without acknowledging the interpretation’s longevity. 
Before examining federal courts’ haphazard treatment of longstanding 
agency interpretations, it is worth briefly summarizing the deference 
regimes that the Supreme Court has established for the judicial review of 
agency statutory interpretations.  The most famous of the Court’s deference 
regimes is set forth in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.29  Chevron directs courts to defer to reasonable agency 
 27. The agency itself should remain entitled to change its own statutory interpretation, 
even if longstanding, for the reasons discussed infra Part III. 
 28. These cases were identified primarily through language-based searches (for “agency 
/s interpret! /s long-standing consistent!”) supplemented by keynote searches.  For a list of 
the cases reviewed, see Table 1.  These findings are also illustrated in a searchable table 
available online. See Table 1:  Longstanding Interpretation Cases Reviewed, FORDHAM LAW 
REVIEW, http://fordhamlawreview.org/articles/table-1-longstanding-interpretation-cases-
reviewed. 
 29. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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interpretations of statutory gaps and ambiguities.30  Specifically, Chevron 
articulates a two-part inquiry to be conducted by courts reviewing agency 
statutory interpretations.  First, reviewing courts are to ask “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”31  This 
inquiry has come to be known as Chevron Step One.  If the court 
determines that Congress has spoken to the precise question at issue, then 
the agency is bound by Congress’s directive.32  But if the court determines 
that Congress has not directly addressed the question at issue, judicial 
review proceeds to a second inquiry—known as Chevron Step Two—which 
directs courts to defer to an agency’s interpretation so long as it is 
“reasonable.”33 
Not all agency interpretations, however, qualify for Chevron’s two-step 
inquiry.  In United States v. Mead Corp.,34 the Supreme Court limited 
Chevron’s reach to those cases in which “it appears that Congress delegated 
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, 
and [in which] the agency interpretation claiming deference was 
promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”35  In practice, this appears to 
mean that formal agency actions such as notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and formal adjudication will qualify for Chevron treatment, while lesser 
actions such as the issuing of opinion letters or agency manuals will not.36  
Agency interpretations that do not qualify for Chevron deference under 
Mead’s “force of law” test are subject to a third deference regime, 
articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.37  Skidmore states that agency views 
“constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts 
and litigants may properly resort for guidance” and directs courts to give 
weight to an agency’s interpretation according to “the thoroughness evident 
in [the agency’s] consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency 
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”38 
 30. Id. at 842–44. 
 31. Id. at 842. 
 32. Id. at 842–43. 
 33. Id. at 843–44.  Scholars have debated whether these two steps are really two versions 
of the same question. See Bamberger & Strauss, supra note 3 (no); Stephenson & Vermeule, 
supra note 3 (yes). 
 34. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 35. Id. at 226–27.  This limitation, or threshold “force of law inquiry” has come to be 
called Chevron “Step Zero.” See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s 
Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 
187, 191 (2006). 
 36. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31; Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586–87 
(2000).  Of course, even if an agency interpretation qualifies for Chevron analysis, it must 
pass Chevron’s two-step test in order to receive deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44. 
 37. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234 (“Chevron did nothing to 
eliminate Skidmore’s holding that an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference 
whatever its form”). 
 38. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.  Chevron, Mead, and Skidmore are the main deference 
regimes that govern judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, but the Court has 
established other deference tests and doctrines applicable to specific subject areas as well. 
See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978) (heightened deference 
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Notably, the above deference regimes do not require judges to pay any 
attention to the longevity of an agency’s interpretation.  The Court’s 
opinions in Mead and Skidmore note that the “consistency” of an agency 
interpretation is a factor to be considered when evaluating the 
interpretation’s persuasiveness, but the opinions give no other direction to 
judges.39  Further, federal courts lack any clear rules for where the 
longevity of an agency interpretation fits in the hierarchy of different 
deference regimes.  In some cases, courts mention longevity as part of the 
Chevron Step Two inquiry regarding the “reasonableness” or 
“permissibility” of the agency’s interpretation.40  In other cases, they 
discuss longevity as one of the persuasiveness factors considered under 
Skidmore.41  Occasionally, longevity is considered as part of a court’s Mead 
“Step Zero” analysis, to help determine whether an agency has the power to 
act with the force of law and, therefore, to receive Chevron deference in the 
first place.42  In still other cases, federal courts cite an agency 
interpretation’s longstanding pedigree without reference to any of the 
Supreme Court’s deference regimes or tests.43  In short, there is no 
coherence or order to judicial treatment of an agency interpretation’s 
longevity. 
for NLRB decisions); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) 
(heightened deference to executive for international, military, and national security 
decisions). 
 39. Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). 
 40. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218–24 (2009); Barnhart 
v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219–20 (2002); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 
(1996); NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124 
n.20 (1987); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1986); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 
476 U.S. 974, 979–84 (1986); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Counsel, 470 U.S. 
116, 125, 134 (1985); Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 
1243, 1253–54 (9th Cir. 2007); Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 F.3d 284, 289 (3d 
Cir. 2007); Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438, 442–443 (1st Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Baxter 
Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 887 (11th Cir. 2003). 
 41. See, e.g., Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (citing 
Chevron in passing without applying two-step analysis); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 
U.S. 426, 438–39 (1986); U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597, 
612 n.14 (1986) (citing Chevron after noting longevity, but not going through full two-step 
analysis). 
 42. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 183 
(3d Cir. 2009); Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 43. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 239–40 (2005); id. at 243 (Scalia, 
J., concurring) (noting the majority’s oversight and stating that Chevron should apply); INS 
v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189–90 (1991); W. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 412 (1985); United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1982); 
Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296–97 (1985); Morrison-
Knudsen Const. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 461 U.S. 624, 634–35 
(1983); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 989–90 (9th Cir. 1992); Uselton v. Commercial 
Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 578–79 (10th Cir. 1991); Burton v. Derwinski, 
933 F.2d 988, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Anderson Shipping Co. v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1387, 1391 
(D.C. Cir. 1988). 
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A.   Loose Plus Factor 
Things do not look much better when we examine the substantive manner 
in which federal courts treat longstanding agency statutory interpretations.  
Federal courts often uphold agency statutory interpretations, including those 
that are longstanding, but their opinions fail to provide any clear rule for 
how much longevity counts in the deference analysis.  In many cases, 
federal courts mention the fact that an agency interpretation is longstanding 
only in passing—almost as an afterthought or vague plus factor supporting 
the court’s independent reading of the statute.  The courts’ opinions in these 
cases tend to spend considerable space construing the relevant statute from 
scratch, using traditional tools of interpretation, and then add a sentencing 
beginning “In addition” or “Finally, we note” in which they observe that the 
agency in charge has interpreted the statute the same way for years.44  As a 
result, it is almost impossible to tell how much weight the court has placed 
on the fact than an agency interpretation has been in effect for a long time, 
and the implication is that the longevity of the interpretation did not 
significantly affect the court’s ruling. 
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Smith v. City of 
Jackson.45  Smith involved a lawsuit brought by police and public safety 
officers against the city contending that the city’s salary increase plan 
violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act46 (ADEA) because it 
was less generous to officers over the age of forty than to younger 
officers.47  Two federal agencies, the U.S. Department of Labor and the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), had long interpreted 
the ADEA to authorize disparate impact claims of this kind, but the City of 
Jackson challenged the agencies’ longstanding reading.48  On review, the 
Supreme Court examined other parallel statutes, Supreme Court precedent, 
statutory text, and legislative history, and concluded that all of these 
traditional tools supported a finding that disparate impact claims were 
allowed under the ADEA.49  The Court then observed, “Finally, we note 
 44. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 
(2011) (stating that longevity “add[s] force” to Court’s construction of statute); Barnhart v. 
Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 219–20 (2002) (“In addition, the Agency’s regulations reflect the 
Agency’s own longstanding interpretation. . . .  [T]his Court will normally accord particular 
deference to an agency interpretation of ‘longstanding’ duration.”); Morrison-Knudsen, 461 
U.S. at 634 (“Finally, we note that [the agency] has consistently taken the position that fringe 
benefits are not includible in wages.”); Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334, 1352 (9th Cir. 
2011) (“One final consideration” is that “Act has long been interpreted” this way); Ammex, 
Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Additionally, the fact that the IRS 
has left Revenue Ruling 69-159 virtually unchanged for over three decades demonstrates the 
soundness of the decision.”); see also United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 
at 124 n.20; Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. at 612 n.14; E.I. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54–55 (1977); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Labor, 557 F.3d 165, 183 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 45. 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 46. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–633, 633a, 634 (2012). 
 47. Smith, 544 U.S. at 231. 
 48. Id. at 232. 
 49. Id. at 233–40. 
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that both the Department of Labor, which initially drafted the legislation, 
and the EEOC, which is the agency charged by Congress with 
responsibility for implementing the statute, . . . have consistently interpreted 
the ADEA to authorize relief on a disparate-impact theory.”50  The 
agencies’ interpretation had been in place for nearly twenty-five years,51 but 
the Court’s casual, last-minute mention made it sound as though this 
mattered little in its analysis. 
Confusingly, the “afterthought” cases contrast with several cases in 
which federal courts emphasize the longevity of an agency interpretation, 
discussing the interpretation’s history in detail or pointing to its vintage as 
“persuasive evidence” of its accuracy or as a reason to afford it “great 
deference.”52  In such cases, federal courts seem to be giving significant 
consideration to the longevity of the agency’s interpretation—longevity is 
mentioned as more than just a brief “final” consideration.  But these cases, 
too, ultimately are vague about the role that longevity plays in the judicial 
review of agency interpretations, expressly noting that longevity is not a 
“controlling” factor or discussing it along with several other factors.53 
Federal courts’ treatment of longstanding agency interpretations is 
further complicated by the fact that some of the above cases stress the 
“contemporaneousness” of the agency’s interpretation along with its 
 50. Id. at 239. 
 51. Id. at 243–44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 47,724, 47,727 (Sept. 29, 
1981)). 
 52. See, e.g., Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461, 487 (2004) 
(recognizing that longstanding agency interpretations are entitled to “particular deference” 
(quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002)), and upholding an agency 
construction in part because it was “reflected in interpretive guides the Agency has several 
times published”); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 644–45 (1998) (detailing longstanding 
and consistent interpretation by multiple agencies); NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. 
Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 189–90 (1981) (detailing NLRB’s forty-year history of 
interpreting relevant statutory provision); Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 
319, 332 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“It is highly significant here that the agency’s ‘interpretation is 
one of long standing.’” (quoting Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221)); Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 
545 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a longstanding agency interpretation was 
entitled to “a great deal of persuasive weight”); Council Tree Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 503 
F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[C]ourts give ‘considerable weight’ to a ‘consistent and 
longstanding interpretation by the agency’ responsible for administering a statute.” (quoting 
Int’l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 
1106 (3d Cir. 1980))). 
 53. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565 (1982) (“Although not 
determinative, the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is 
entitled to great deference, particularly when that interpretation has been followed 
consistently over a long period of time.”); United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 
422 U.S. 694, 717 (1975) (longstanding agency interpretation is “impressive evidence” 
entitled to “considerable weight” though “not controlling”); Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975) (longstanding interpretation entitled to 
“great respect”); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 73–74 (1974) (“Our conclusion reflects the 
administrative practice, dating back at least to 1927 . . . .  [L]ongstanding administrative 
construction is entitled to great weight.”); Menkes, 637 F.3d at 332 (one of many factors 
discussed); Estate of Landers, 545 F.3d at 107–111 (longevity persuasive, but also examines 
text and judicial precedents); Council Tree Commc’ns, 503 F.3d at 288–90 (one of many 
factors). 
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longevity.54  Contemporaneousness is believed to enhance an 
interpretation’s claim to accuracy because it means that the interpretation 
was adopted shortly after the statute itself, under the watchful eye of the 
enacting Congress and ostensibly by administrators familiar with the 
enacting Congress’s views.55  Other cases emphasize that Congress has 
revisited and reenacted the statute at issue without disturbing the agency’s 
longstanding interpretation.56  Legislative reenactment of the statute is 
taken to enhance an agency interpretation’s claim to accuracy because it 
implies congressional awareness and approval of the agency’s statutory 
construction, rather than mere legislative inattention.57  But 
contemporaneousness and congressional reenactment are not present in all 
of the cases in which federal courts defer to longstanding agency 
interpretations, nor are they treated as dispositive factors when they are 
present.58  Thus it is unclear whether contemporaneousness and 
congressional reenactment are helpful, necessary, or merely interesting 
 54. See Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. at 718 (contemporaneous interpretation 
consistently maintained by SEC); Chemehuevi Tribe, 420 U.S. at 409–10 (longstanding 
construction entitled to “great respect,” “particularly when it involves a contemporaneous 
construction of the Act by the officials charged with the responsibility of setting its 
machinery in motion”); Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957) (“The 
contemporaneous and long-standing interpretation of any regulatory Act by the agency that 
administers it is entitled to great weight.”); Davis v. Manry, 266 U.S. 401, 404–05 (1925) 
(same); see also W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (same); Ariz. Health 
Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 1243, 1253–54 (9th Cir. 2007); Sai 
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 262 (2d Cir. 2009); Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985, 989 
(9th Cir. 1992). 
 55. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 3, at 368 (explaining that one rationale for deference to 
an agency’s contemporaneous interpretation is that “[t]he agency that enforces the statute 
may have had a hand in drafting its provisions” and “may possess an internal history in the 
form of documents or ‘handed-down oral tradition’ that casts light on the meaning of a 
difficult phrase or provision”). 
 56. See, e.g., CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986) (“It is well established that when 
Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding administrative interpretation without 
pertinent change, the ‘congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency’s interpretation is 
persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress.’” (quoting 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 274–75 (1974))); Young v. Cmty. Nutrition 
Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 983 (1986) (“[I]n revisiting § 346, Congress did not change the 
procedures . . . .  This failure to change the scheme under which the FDA operated is 
significant.”); FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437 (1986) (“At no point did 
Congress criticize the FDIC’s longstanding interpretation. . . .  In fact, Congress had 
reenacted the 1935 provisions in 1950 without changing the definition of ‘deposit’ at all.”); 
Chemehuevi Tribe, 420 U.S. at 410 (“The deference due this longstanding administrative 
construction is enhanced by the fact that Congress gave no indication of its dissatisfaction 
with the agency’s interpretation . . . when it amended the Act in 1930 . . . or when it 
reenacted the Federal Water Power Act in 1935.”); Saxbe, 419 U.S. at 74 (“This 
longstanding administrative construction is entitled to great weight, particularly when, as 
here, [C]ongress has revisited the Act and left the practice untouched.”); Les v. Reilly, 968 
F.2d 985, 990 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Congress has repeatedly ratified a strict interpretation of the 
Delaney clause by reenacting [the relevant provision] . . . without changing the Agency’s 
interpretation.”); Lamoille Valley R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 711 F.2d 295, 324 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(“That consistent interpretation is entitled to deference, especially since Congress implicitly 
approved that interpretation in revising and reenacting [the statute].”). 
 57. This theoretical assumption is discussed in greater detail infra Part II.A. 
 58. See Table 1. 
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asides in the judicial calculus of whether to defer to a longstanding agency 
interpretation. 
In short, judicial references to the longevity of an agency interpretation 
are a jumble.  Courts engage in a lot of loose talk about the relevance of 
longevity, but they provide no consistent rules or practices to govern if, 
when, or how federal courts should factor longevity into their review of 
agency statutory interpretations. 
B.   Irrelevant 
Further complicating the doctrine in this area is the surprising finding 
that federal courts (or at least majority opinions) sometimes completely 
ignore the fact that an agency interpretation is longstanding when reviewing 
it.  What is puzzling about these cases is that the majority appears aware of 
the interpretation’s longevity.  Indeed, concurring opinions in these cases 
often explicitly point out the fact that the agency interpretation is 
longstanding, as do the parties’ briefs.59  Moreover, these cases are no 
different, doctrinally or in terms of interpretive techniques, than the cases 
discussed in Part I.A, which make at least passing mention of an agency 
interpretation’s vintage.  The cases in which courts ignore longevity do not, 
for example, involve statutory text that is exceptionally clear, so as to 
eliminate the need for consideration of other interpretive factors like 
longevity.  Further, it would cost the majority little to mention an 
interpretation’s longevity in these cases.  The majority’s failure even to 
acknowledge the longevity of the agency’s interpretation in such cases 
suggests an unspoken judgment that longevity does not matter much in the 
deference analysis. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon60 is illustrative.  Babbitt involved a 1975 
regulation promulgated by the U.S. Interior Department that interpreted the 
term “harm” in the Endangered Species Act61 (ESA) to include “significant 
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife.”62  The majority opinion in Babbitt relied on ordinary meaning, 
the whole act rule, the noscitur a sociis language canon, statutory purpose, 
legislative history, and a 1982 amendment to the ESA, among other 
 59. See, e.g., Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870–71 (2011) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion, and add a fortifying observation:  
Today’s decision accords with the longstanding views of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency that administers Title VII.”); Del. 
River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F.3d 615, 624 (3d Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., concurring) 
(noting that “[t]he regulation at issue here has been in effect for over 20 years. It has been 
applied, not 252 times, but 66,000 times in the past year alone”); Brief for Petitioner at 21–
26, Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 863 (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 3501186, at *21–26. 
 60. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 61. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1537, 1537a, 1538–1544 (1973). 
 62. See Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 690–91; 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994).  The Secretary originally 
promulgated the regulation in 1975 and amended it in 1981 to emphasize that actual death or 
injury of a protected animal is necessary for a violation. See 40 Fed. Reg. 44,412, 44,416 
(Sept. 26, 1975); 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (Nov. 4, 1981). 
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interpretive tools, to determine that the Interior Department’s regulation 
provided a reasonable construction of the statute.63  Although the regulation 
was twenty years old by the time of the Court’s decision, the Court nowhere 
acknowledged—let alone relied on—this fact in its analysis.64  In effect, the 
majority treated the longevity of the agency’s interpretation as irrelevant to 
its review. 
It is difficult to square such “irrelevance” cases with the “afterthought” 
cases, in which courts go out of their way to mention longevity, or with the 
“great deference” cases, in which courts emphasize longevity as an 
important factor favoring judicial deference to an agency interpretation.  
Indeed, the contrast between the majority’s careless attitude toward 
longevity in the “irrelevance” cases and its rhetoric emphasizing longevity 
as a grounds for “great deference” in other cases highlights the utter 
indeterminacy of legal doctrine surrounding longstanding agency 
interpretations. 
Relatedly, federal courts also sometimes reject longstanding agency 
interpretations without mentioning the interpretation’s vintage.65  
Dissenting or concurring opinions in such cases tend to point out the 
interpretation’s longevity and to castigate the majority for paying 
insufficient heed to the agency’s established practice.66  Here, the puzzle is 
why the majority does not acknowledge and seek to explain away the 
significance of the interpretation’s longevity.  As in the cases where courts 
fail to mention longevity despite the fact that doing so would add 
legitimacy to their statutory analysis, federal courts’ failure to address 
longevity when rejecting an established agency interpretation underscores 
the uncertain status of longevity in deference analysis:  if longevity carried 
significant weight in the deference calculus, then we would expect courts to 
at least attempt to explain their reasons for construing a statute in a way that 
upsets established agency practice. 
To be fair, only a handful of “irrelevance” cases emerged in my review.67  
One reason may be that cases in which a court ignores the longevity of an 
 63. See Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697–708. 
 64. The Court did note that the regulation had “been in place since 1975” but did not 
calculate its vintage or ascribe any weight to that vintage in its analysis. Id. at 691 & n.2. 
 65. See Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 462 n.3, 468 (9th Cir. 2008); Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 501–02 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 347 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 66. See, e.g., Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1210 (9th Cir. 2009) (Clifton, J., 
concurring in part) (“[T]he majority holds that sixty-eight years of agency practice was 
contrary to the will of Congress and in violation of the plain language of the statute the 
agency is charged with interpreting.”); Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 
490 (5th Cir. 2002) (King, C.J., dissenting). 
 67. My research revealed seven such cases.  In two of these, the majority opinion 
ignored an interpretation’s longevity while upholding the interpretation. See Thompson v. N. 
Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870–71 (2011); Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 
F.3d 615, 624 (3d Cir. 2006) (Fisher, J., concurring).  In the other five cases, the majority 
rejected a longstanding interpretation without acknowledging its longevity. See Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471, 501–02 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting), superseded by 
 
1838 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
agency interpretation are difficult to identify in any systematic manner.  But 
the fact that even a handful of such cases exist—and that they involve what 
only can be knowing, rather than inadvertent,68 judicial disregard of an 
agency interpretation’s longevity—strikingly illustrates federal courts’ 
confused, chaotic approach to the review of longstanding agency 
interpretations. 
C.   Rejected 
Finally, federal courts sometimes acknowledge that an agency 
interpretation is longstanding but refuse outright to defer to it.  In such 
cases, courts give varying reasons for why an interpretation’s longevity 
should not weigh heavily in their deference analysis.  For example, in cases 
where Congress has reenacted the relevant statute without disturbing the 
agency’s interpretation, courts insist that the reenactment was not 
meaningful—either because Congress focused on matters unrelated to the 
agency interpretation or because Congress never expressly referenced the 
agency interpretation during the course of reenactment.69  The Supreme 
Court’s statements in Aaron v. SEC70 are illustrative: 
Congress was expressly informed of the Commission’s interpretation on 
two occasions when significant amendments to the securities laws were 
enacted . . . and on each occasion Congress left the administrative 
interpretation undisturbed.  But, since the legislative consideration of 
those statutes was addressed principally to matters other than that at 
issue here, it is our view that the failure of Congress to overturn the 
Commission’s interpretation falls far short of providing a basis to support 
a construction of § 10(b) so clearly at odds with its plain meaning and 
legislative history.71 
Consider how different such cases sound from those in Part I.A in which 
courts state that a longstanding interpretation that Congress fails to disturb 
during reenactment should be entitled to “particular deference.”72  Indeed, 
many of the afterthought cases discussed in Part I.A also involved a 
congressional reenactment that focused on matters not directly related to the 
agency interpretation, and almost none of the cases involved express 
statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; City of 
Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 347 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Abebe, 554 F.3d at 1210 (Clifton, J., 
concurring in part); Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456, 462 n.3, 468 (9th Cir. 2008); Rose 
Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d at 490 (King, J. dissenting). 
 68. As discussed supra note 59 and the accompanying text, the majority must at least be 
aware of the vintage of the agency interpretations it is reviewing because concurring or 
dissenting opinions in these cases explicitly discuss the longevity of the interpretations. 
 69. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994) (makes no reference); Aaron v. SEC, 
446 U.S. 680, 694 n.11 (1980) (unrelated matters); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978) 
(never expressly referenced); Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., Inc. v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467, 
1477 (11th Cir. 1997) (makes no reference). 
 70. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). 
 71. Id. at 694 n.11 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  For additional examples of 
cases in which federal courts have rejected longstanding agency interpretations, see Table 1 
(listing nineteen such cases). 
 72. See supra note 44. 
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congressional mention of the interpretation at issue.73  Further, courts on 
occasion have rejected a longstanding agency interpretation even when 
there were signs that Congress had expressly acknowledged and approved 
of the interpretation.  In SEC v. Sloan,74 for example, a committee report 
written during the reenactment process explicitly affirmed the SEC’s 
interpretation—but the Supreme Court nevertheless refused to defer to that 
interpretation, stating, “We are extremely hesitant to presume general 
congressional awareness of the Commission’s construction based only upon 
a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative 
documents.”75 
The markers seem to keep moving in these cases.  Because there is no 
established doctrine governing the significance of longstanding 
interpretations or of legislative reenactment that fails to disturb a 
longstanding interpretation, courts characterize the applicable rule 
differently from case to case.  Illustratively, the case review conducted for 
this Article found thirty-five (of sixty-six) cases in which a federal court or 
a litigant noted some form of legislative acquiescence—which almost 
always involved a congressional reenactment or amendment that failed to 
undo the agency’s interpretation.76  Of these thirty-five cases involving 
legislative acquiescence, courts rejected the agency’s interpretation in 
eleven and upheld it in twenty-four.77 
Federal courts also openly reject longstanding agency interpretations on 
more general grounds, arguing that the interpretation does not deserve much 
weight because (1) it is inconsistent with the meaning ascribed to other, 
similar statutes; (2) it conflicts with substantive canons reflecting 
background judicial norms; (3) it contradicts the statute’s supposedly plain 
text; or (4) the interpretation simply is unpersuasive.78  In other words, they 
treat longevity as an interpretive factor that can be trumped by almost any 
other interpretive factor.  The Second Circuit, for example, concluded in 
Mayburg v. Secretary of Health and Human Services79 that sister circuits’ 
decisions, dictionary definitions of the term at issue, practical 
 73. See supra note 44. But see Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 
420 U.S. 395, 410 (1975) (involving express congressional affirmation of agency’s 
interpretation); Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74 (1974) (same). 
 74. 436 U.S. 103 (1978). 
 75. Id. at 121. 
 76. See Table 1 (reporting twenty-eight cases involving reenactment or amendment, two 
involving rejected proposals). 
 77. See Table 1. 
 78. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (invoking statutory text, 
dictionary definitions, other similar statutes, the whole act rule, federalism canons of 
construction, and constitutional avoidance canon to reject longstanding interpretation); 
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248–51 (1991) (relying significantly on 
presumption against extraterritorial application of domestic statutes), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1075, 1078, 1079 (codified at42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-5); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 170–72 (1989) 
(inconsistent with plain language of the statute), superseded by statute, Older Workers 
Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990); Mayburg v. Sec’y of 
Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 105–06 (1st Cir. 1984) (not persuasive enough). 
 79. 740 F.2d 100 (1st Cir. 1984). 
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considerations, and interpretive canons calling for liberal construction of the 
Social Security Act were “simply more persuasive” than the agency’s 
longstanding interpretation.80  The Supreme Court similarly ruled in EEOC 
v. Arabian American Oil Co.81 that an eleven-year-old agency interpretation 
was unworthy of deference because its “persuasive value is limited.”82 
Contrast those cases with the Supreme Court’s declaration in Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA83 that longstanding 
agency interpretations are entitled to “particular deference,”84 or with the 
Third Circuit’s statement in Council Tree Communications, Inc. v. FCC85 
that “courts ‘give considerable weight to a consistent and longstanding 
interpretation by the agency’ responsible for administering a statute.”86  
Unless federal courts in the latter set of cases are being disingenuous when 
they ascribe extra force to longstanding interpretations, the two sets of cases 
are difficult to reconcile with each other.  If longstanding interpretations are 
to receive “particular deference” or “considerable weight” rather than 
ordinary deference (or weight), then they must count somewhat more than 
other interpretive factors and tools that ordinarily are used to construe 
statutes.  At the very least, they should not lightly be dismissed as 
“unpersuasive”—rather, rejecting them should require serious explanation.  
But that is not what the cases show; instead, the cases reveal easily 
overcome-able loose plus factor treatment of longstanding agency 
interpretations and correspondingly troubling inconsistencies—whether 
intentional or inadvertent—in the level of deference that courts afford to 
such interpretations.   
A point of clarification may be in order here:  this Article does not mean 
to suggest that federal courts are rejecting longstanding agency statutory 
interpretations at an alarmingly high rate.  In fact, empirical evidence from 
one prominent study suggests that, at least at the Supreme Court level, 
agency statutory interpretations generally enjoy good rates of judicial 
deference (68.8 percent), and that longstanding agency interpretations enjoy 
slightly higher rates of deference still (73.2 percent).87  And the evidence 
from this Article’s case review shows similar rates of deference (69.7 
percent, or forty-six of sixty-six cases).88  But rates of deference do not tell 
the whole story.  For one thing, the fact that overall rates of judicial 
deference to agency interpretations are strong makes it all the more 
noteworthy—and perhaps especially unprincipled—when federal courts 
reject a longstanding agency interpretation with little explanation.  Further, 
as this Article’s doctrinal analysis reveals, rates of deference can mask a 
 80. Id. at 102–06. 
 81. 499 U.S. 244 (1991). 
 82. Id. at 258. 
 83. 540 U.S. 461 (2004). 
 84. Id. at 487 (quoting Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 220 (2002)). 
 85. 503 F.3d 284 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 86. Id. at 289 (quoting Int’l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. Westinghouse 
Electric Corp., 631 F.2d 1094, 1106 (3d Cir. 1980)). 
 87. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at 1148–49. 
 88. See Table 1. 
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lack of logical coherence or stability regarding the factors that should 
matter in determining the appropriate level of deference to a longstanding 
agency interpretation.  In other words, because federal courts lack a 
coherent approach to the judicial review of longstanding agency 
interpretations, their treatment of such interpretations has been 
substantively erratic and inconsistent across cases, providing no measures 
to ensure that the appropriate factors are taken into account—or that any 
factors consistently are taken into account—in deciding whether to respect 
longstanding agency judgments.  For example, the length of time that an 
interpretation has been in effect does not provide any consistent guide as to 
how a federal court will treat the interpretation.  As Table 1 shows, in 
approximately one-fourth of the cases reviewed for this Article (seventeen 
of sixty-six), federal courts rejected an agency interpretation that had been 
in place for over ten years, and twelve of those interpretations had been in 
effect for over twenty years.89  Further, out of seven agency interpretations 
that had been in place for less than ten years at the time of judicial review, 
courts rejected three and upheld four; and out of six agency interpretations 
that were in place for less than fifteen years, federal courts rejected three 
and upheld three.90  Other rejected interpretations had been in effect for 
anywhere from sixteen to sixty-nine years. 
Nor does the identity of the agency responsible for the interpretation, the 
form of the agency’s interpretation, or the reasons that motivate a particular 
challenge to an interpretation seem to play any consistent role in federal 
courts’ deference analysis.  Again, as Table 1 shows, in the cases reviewed 
for this Article, federal courts rejected twenty longstanding agency 
interpretations and ignored-but-upheld two.  Of the rejected interpretations, 
seven involved agency constructions that took the form of a regulation, five 
involved agency adjudications, three involved constructions printed in an 
agency handbook or policy manual, three constructions were formulated as 
part of an agency’s litigation position, and four involved agency 
constructions that took some other form (such as an interpretive rule).91  In 
terms of agency identity, the closest thing to a pattern that emerges is the 
federal courts’ handling of EEOC interpretations—but even then the data 
demonstrates inconsistency.  Of twenty rejected longstanding 
interpretations, three were made by the EEOC,92 and both of the two 
ignored-but-upheld interpretations were supported, if not made in the first 
instance, by the EEOC.93  On the other hand, two longstanding 
interpretations rendered by the EEOC were upheld.94 
 89. Table 1. 
 90. Table 1. 
 91. See Table 1. 
 92. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011); W. Air Lines, Inc. v. 
Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (upholding interpretation made by the Department of Labor 
and later adopted by the EEOC). 
 93. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. 527 U.S. 471 (1999); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989). 
 94. See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011); 
Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
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Nor, as Table 2 indicates, did the reason motivating litigants’ challenge 
to an agency interpretation seem to affect federal courts’ deference analysis.  
The most common reasons behind challenges to an agency’s longstanding 
statutory construction were litigant “attempts to obtain or increase a 
government benefit” and “employer defenses to claims of a statutory 
violation.”95  Federal courts were uneven in their review of such challenges, 
upholding them two-thirds of the time and rejecting them one-third of the 
time.  Even when the reason for a challenge was that factual circumstances 
(such as technology) or the surrounding law had changed so much as to 
render the agency interpretation outdated—a seemingly strong reason for 
overriding a longstanding agency construction—federal courts were 
inconsistent in their judicial review, rejecting the construction in two cases, 
ignoring its longevity but upholding it in one, and upholding the 
construction despite changed circumstances in five cases.96  In fact, the 
only somewhat consistently handled categories of agency challenges were 
(1) those involving challenges to the agency’s authority or in which litigants 
insisted upon judicial review of a particular form of agency decision and (2) 
challenges to a new agency regulation based on a longstanding agency 
position; for both categories of challenges, federal courts routinely upheld 
the agency’s interpretation.97 
Given the above, this Article’s primary concern is not so much with 
increasing the number of longstanding agency interpretations that receive 
judicial deference (although if longstanding agency interpretations deserve 
to be treated like legal precedents, then federal courts’ failure to uphold 
them in nearly one-third of the cases could be considered problematic), but 
with remedying the doctrinal disarray and inconsistency that has resulted 
from the current lack of a coherent theoretical framework for the judicial 
review of such interpretations.  To that end, Part III provides suggestions 
for simplifying and regularizing the judicial review of longstanding agency 
interpretations. 
Before turning to the proposals in Part III, however, it is worth pausing to 
consider the mismatch between the chaotic judicial treatment of 
longstanding agency statutory interpretations and the heightened deference 
that courts afford to longstanding judicial interpretations of statutes98 and to 
historical practices of the executive branch when confronting questions of 
constitutional interpretation.99  As the next part discusses, the theoretical 
assumptions that underlie heightened deference to established judicial 
interpretations of statutes and to established practice by the executive in 
constitutional interpretation also support at least some form of precedential 
effect or heightened presumption in favor of longstanding agency 
interpretations of statutes. 
 95. See Table 2. 
 96. See Table 2. 
 97. Table 2.  For additional examples and reasons, see Table 3.  
 98. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 99. See infra notes 107–11 and accompanying text. 
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II.   STATUTORY STARE DECISIS AND HISTORICAL EXECUTIVE PRACTICE:  
ASSUMPTIONS AND ANALOGIES 
Institutional precedent and past practice are revered metrics in the law.  
As every first-year law student learns, custom and past practice play a 
significant role in common law analysis, and prior judicial decisions are 
treated as binding on future courts under the principle of stare decisis.  But 
beyond the fundamental respect for past practice and precedent that 
undergirds the legal system, courts accord special effect to two forms of 
institutional precedent that are close analogues to longstanding agency 
statutory interpretations:  prior judicial interpretations of statutes and 
historical executive practice in matters that implicate the separation of 
powers.  With respect to the first, the Supreme Court has adopted a tiered 
hierarchy of stare decisis for different kinds of judicial precedent.100  Under 
this hierarchy, common law precedents enjoy a strong presumption of 
correctness; constitutional precedents receive a weaker presumption of 
correctness because the difficulty of amending the Constitution makes the 
Court the only institution that effectively can correct interpretive mistakes; 
and statutory precedents receive a super-strong presumption of correctness 
because Congress rather than the Court has the power and obligation to 
correct mistakes in this area.101  Indeed, the general rule is that the Supreme 
Court will not overrule its own statutory precedents even when a majority 
of its current members believes the original interpretation to be incorrect.102 
The classic example of strict adherence to statutory precedent is Flood v. 
Kuhn,103 a 1972 case in which the Court refused to interpret the Sherman 
Act to apply to professional baseball because of two longstanding Supreme 
Court precedents that had held that baseball was not interstate commerce 
under the Act.104  Despite changes in the way professional baseball was 
exhibited and marketed and intervening Supreme Court decisions applying 
the Sherman Act to other professional sports including football and hockey, 
the Court insisted on adhering to its original interpretation:  “We continue 
to be loath, 50 years after Federal Baseball and almost two decades after 
Toolson, to overturn those cases judicially when Congress, by its positive 
inaction, has allowed those decisions to stand for so long . . . .”105 
 100. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1362. 
 101. See id. 
 102. For examples of the Supreme Court’s refusal to overrule arguably outdated statutory 
precedents, see Square D. Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 476 U.S. 409 (1986); 
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); 
Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1945).  This is not to say that the Court never 
overrules statutory precedents—it does—but such overrulings occur infrequently, usually 
with an explanation that one of the traditional theoretical reasons justifying stare decisis does 
not apply. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1368–69 (finding that from 1961 to 1986 the 
Supreme Court overruled its own statutory precedents twenty-six times, or once per term, 
and when it did so it often justified the overruling based on lack of public or private reliance 
or on Congress’s decision to leave development of the particular statutory scheme to the 
courts). 
 103. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 104. Id. at 283–84. 
 105. Id. 
 
1844 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
The same could be said for agency interpretations of statutes that 
Congress has allowed to stand for several years.  This is particularly so 
because, as discussed below, there is evidence that Congress itself is much 
more attuned to agency statutory interpretation than to judicial statutory 
interpretation.106  Accordingly, it could be argued that Congress’s failure to 
overturn a longstanding agency interpretation should be given at least as 
much weight as its failure to overturn a longstanding judicial construction. 
In addition, as Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison recently have 
highlighted, courts and commentators regularly defer to past executive 
practice when interpreting the scope of executive power under the 
Constitution.107  Judicial recognition of a practice-based “gloss” on 
constitutional interpretation reaches back at least as far as Justice 
Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer,108 which observed that 
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge 
of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents 
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such 
exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated 
as a gloss on “executive Power” vested in the President by § 1 of Art. 
II.109 
Again, the same can be said for executive branch interpretations made by 
administrative agencies.  Historical executive practice “gloss” also has roots 
in Justice Jackson’s more famous concurring opinion in Youngstown.  
Jackson’s concurrence articulated a three-tiered framework for evaluating 
the scope of presidential power, providing that the President’s power is at 
its maximum when supported by express or implied congressional 
authorization, at its lowest when contradicted by Congress’s express or 
implied position, and in an in-between “zone of twilight” when Congress 
has neither granted nor denied the President’s authority to act.110  
Regarding the middle zone, Jackson argued that “congressional inertia, 
indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, 
enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility.”111 
As these excerpts from Flood and Youngstown suggest, part of the 
theoretical justification for statutory stare decisis and deference to past 
executive practice is presumed legislative acquiescence in the judiciary’s 
and executive’s longstanding interpretations.  Courts and commentators 
 106. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 107. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of 
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 (2012).  One prominent example includes the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on “long practice under the pardoning power and acquiescence in it” to 
conclude that the President’s pardon power extends to a contempt of court conviction. See 
Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925).  For additional examples, see Bradley & 
Morrison, supra, at 419 n.17. 
 108. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 109. Id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 110. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 111. Id. 
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also offer other theoretical grounds for deference to these two forms of 
institutional precedent, including:  soundness, institutional competence, and 
reliance interests.  This part examines the theoretical assumptions that 
underlie federal courts’ heightened deference to judicial interpretations of 
statutes and to executive practice in the separation of powers context and 
argues that these assumptions support at least some form of precedential 
effect for longstanding agency statutory interpretations as well. 
A.   Acquiescence 
The acquiescence argument for statutory stare decisis is grounded in 
Congress’s power to override judicial interpretations with which it 
disagrees.  Because Congress is the creator of statutory text, it has the 
ability to amend that text in response to judicial interpretations that run 
counter to its intended statutory meaning.  Congressional failure to respond 
to a particular judicial interpretation thus is taken as a sign of legislative 
acquiescence in, or ratification of, that interpretation.112  “If Congress does 
not amend the statute to overrule the statutory precedent, and especially if it 
reenacts the statute without changing the operative language, it is presumed 
that Congress ‘approves’ of the interpretation.”113  William Eskridge has 
theorized that what is going on in these acquiescence cases is not so much a 
judicial assumption that Congress affirmatively approves of any judicial 
interpretation that it fails to override but, rather, a judicial choice to place 
the burden on Congress to respond to any judicial interpretations with 
which it disagrees.114  Viewed in this light, the presumption of 
acquiescence is a default rule of sorts, not a presumption about actual 
congressional intent. 
Reliance on past executive practice in separation of powers analysis rests 
on a similar presumption of congressional acquiescence in the executive’s 
actions.  As Curtis Bradley and Trevor Morrison have shown, claims about 
acquiescence in this context variously cast Congress’s failure to object to 
executive branch actions as a reflection of interbranch agreement about the 
legality of the executive’s practice, as a waiver of Congress’s institutional 
prerogatives, or as a sign that the executive’s actions are unlikely to 
threaten the basic balance of power between the legislative and executive 
branches.115 
These acquiescence arguments apply with at least equal force to 
longstanding agency interpretations of statutes.  As detailed below, 
Congress oversees agency actions much more closely than it does judicial 
decisions—and has available several mechanisms for expressing 
disapproval of agency statutory interpretations that it does not possess vis-
 112. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1366–67. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See William N. Eskridge, Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67, 
108 (1988). 
 115. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 107, at 433–36. 
 
1846 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
à-vis the judiciary or the President acting under his Article II powers.116  
Thus, when Congress fails to counteract an agency statutory interpretation, 
the above assumptions about interbranch agreement, relinquishment of 
institutional prerogatives, and the like are at least equally appropriate. 
It bears noting that the assumption of legislative acquiescence is 
somewhat controversial.  In the contexts of statutory stare decisis and 
longstanding executive practices, it has been criticized as reflecting an 
unrealistic vision of the legislative process.  Several scholars have detailed 
the difficulty of ascertaining a collective legislative intent and the 
legislative process hurdles that make congressional inaction far more likely 
than congressional action, rendering it nearly impossible to ascribe legal 
meaning, even perhaps as a default, to Congress’s failure to act.117  Bradley 
and Morrison similarly have identified structural and political realities that 
leave Congress unlikely to raise significant challenges to executive 
practices that overstep constitutional boundaries—including the President’s 
veto power, free rider problems, congressional obsession with reelection, 
and members’ allegiance to political parties rather than to Congress as an 
institution.118 
However, most of the legislative process criticisms leveled against 
presumed acquiescence in the context of judicial interpretations and 
historical executive practice gloss are significantly dampened in the context 
of longstanding agency interpretations.  There are two institutional reasons 
for this:  (1) the Congressional Review Act119 (CRA), and (2) the numerous 
“soft law” tools that Congress has available to influence agency action.  
These two features of the administrative process provide Congress with far 
greater notice, opportunity, and power to respond negatively to improper 
agency statutory interpretations than it possesses with respect to judicial 
interpretations or to presidential exercises of power under Article II.120  
First, the CRA gives Congress the ability to reject specific administrative 
action—including agency statutory interpretations—through expedited 
procedures.121  The CRA requires that before any administrative rule can 
take effect, the promulgating agency must submit a report with the text of 
the rule and the rule’s concise general statement of basis and purpose to 
 116. See infra notes 120–35 and accompanying text. 
 117. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory 
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994); Eskridge, supra note 114, at 98–
100; Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”:  The Case for an Absolute Rule of Stare 
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 184–196 (1989); Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 
HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930); Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme 
Court, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 375, 375 (1992); Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, 
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 925 (2003). 
 118. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 107, at 440–44.  Bradley and Morrison 
recognize, however, that Congress possesses several “soft law” tools for pushing back 
against the executive branch that are not subject to these constraints. Id. at 446. 
 119. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2012). 
 120. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law:  Lessons from Congressional 
Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573, 606–607 (2008). 
 121. See Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808. 
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each house of Congress and the Comptroller General.122  The rule cannot 
go into effect until at least sixty days after Congress receives the report.123  
During that sixty-day period, the Act provides expedited procedures for 
resolutions opposing the rule to travel to the floor of each house of 
Congress for votes.124  The Act thus ensures that Congress receives notice 
of each and every agency interpretation that is made through a rule,125 and 
gives Congress ample opportunity—including a streamlined legislative 
process—through which to disapprove interpretations that it does not like.  
One administrative law scholar has opined that “[b]y enacting this statute, 
Congress has taken responsibility for supervising agency rulemaking and, 
in a sense, is lending its authority to those rules that it does not overrule 
under the procedure.”126  At a minimum, the Act’s congressional review 
procedures decrease the likelihood that inertia or structural hurdles in the 
legislative process will prevent Congress from expressing disagreement 
with an agency interpretation contained in a rule.  In so doing, the CRA 
increases the likelihood that agency interpretations left intact for years by 
Congress reflect congressional acquiescence—or at least lend legitimacy to 
default rules that make this assumption.127 
Second, Congress possesses several “soft law” tools for influencing 
agency behavior.  For example, Congress has the power to place restrictions 
on the appointment and removal of agency personnel, to specify substantive 
or procedural restrictions on agency authority in an agency’s enabling 
statute, to control an agency’s budget through the appropriations process, to 
conduct oversight hearings scrutinizing agency behavior, and to impose 
deadlines on agency action.  More informally, members of Congress can 
influence agency behavior through unofficial calls, letters, and other ex 
parte contacts with agency officials.128  As Jack Beermann has noted: 
 122. See id. § 801(a)(1)(A). 
 123. See id. § 801(a)(3). 
 124. See id. 
 125. The CRA applies not only to rules adopted through the notice-and-comment process, 
but also to policy statements, interpretative rules, and agency guidance manuals.  The CRA 
defines the term “rule” to have the same meaning as the term “rule” in the Administrative 
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 804(3).  The APA in turn defines “rule” in a manner that 
seems to include regulatory actions such as interpretative rules, technical amendments, and 
policy statements. See id. § 551(4); see also Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional 
Review of Agency Regulations, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 95, 96–97, 102 (1997). 
 126. Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84 
(2006). 
 127. It might be argued that the CRA was not enacted until 1995 and that agency 
interpretations that pre-date the Act thus are subject to the same legislative process hurdles 
as judicial interpretations.  This argument overlooks two important factors.  First, before the 
CRA, Congress regularly used the legislative veto to express disapproval of agency 
interpretations.  See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 496 (1st ed. 
1988); LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 92–103 (1981).  Second, the “soft 
law” tools available to Congress (discussed below) have long been in place and have 
provided ample other avenues for the expression of congressional disapproval. 
 128. See generally CHRISTOPHER H. FOREMAN, JR., SIGNALS FROM THE HILL:  
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SOCIAL REGULATION (1988); see also 
John Copeland Nagel, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1286 (1996). 
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In addition to formal supervision, Congress, or at least small groups and 
individual members of Congress, supervise agencies informally.  Informal 
supervision also takes a variety of forms, including cajoling, adverse 
publicity, audits, investigations, committee hearings, factfinding missions, 
informal contacts with agency members and staff, and pressure on the 
President to appoint persons chosen by members of Congress to agency 
positions.129 
Congress also, of course, can simply threaten legislative action to overturn 
an agency’s interpretation if the agency does not change the interpretation 
itself—something that is much more difficult to do vis-à-vis a court that has 
issued a statutory interpretation that Congress does not like. 
Notably, the “soft law” tools described above can be employed both 
before and after an agency interpretation goes into effect, and so can 
influence agency statutory interpretations even before they are adopted.  
Moreover, because these tools often operate through threats and 
signaling,130 they, like the CRA review mechanism, allow Congress to 
avoid many of the procedural hurdles that can impede the formal overruling 
of a judicial interpretation. 
And in fact, there are several examples of instances where Congress has 
used “soft law” tools to influence agency action in a manner that would not 
be possible with the judiciary or the President.  Consider the FTC’s 
proposed changes to the “Made in USA” labeling requirements in the 
1990s.131  In response to an FTC proposal to lower the percentage of a 
product that must be manufactured in the United States in order to qualify 
for the label, over 200 members of the House cosponsored a resolution 
opposing the proposed guidelines and urging the commission to maintain its 
existing standards;132 the FTC ultimately abandoned its proposed changes 
citing congressional opposition as a factor.133  Another example involves 
Congress’s use of appropriations riders in the 1980s to bar the executive 
branch from taking any action to change the per se rule prohibiting resale 
price maintenance agreements in antitrust law.134  The appropriations rider, 
like many others of its kind, prohibited the expenditure of any funds for 
carrying out the disapproved change in antitrust rules.135 
 129. Beermann, supra note 126, at 70. 
 130. See id. 
 131. See 60 Fed. Reg. 53,922 (Oct. 18, 1995). 
 132. See H.R. Con. Res. 80, 105th Cong. (1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,758 (Dec. 2, 
1997); see also S. Con. Res. 52, 105th Cong. (1997) (urging retention of the “all or virtually 
all” standard). 
 133. See 62 Fed. Reg. 63,756, 63,756, 63,758 (Dec. 2, 1997) (discussing H.R. Con. Res. 
80, 105th Cong. (1997)). 
 134. See J. Gregory Sidak, The Recommendation Clause, 77 GEO. L.J. 2079, 2079–80 & 
n.6 (1989) (citing Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-166, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983)).  For 
further examples of Congress’s use of “soft law” to influence agency action, see Beermann, 
supra note 126, at 85–90; Gersen & Posner, supra note 120, at 606–07; Jamelle Sharpe, 
Judging Congressional Oversight, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 183 (2013). 
 135. Pub. L. No. 98-166 § 510, 97 Stat. 1071, 1102 (1983). 
 
2015] LONGSTANDING AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS 1849 
The upshot of these congressional soft law tools is that they give 
Congress many effective avenues outside the ordinary legislative process 
through which to object to agency statutory interpretations and 
implementations with which it disagrees—avenues that Congress lacks vis-
à-vis the judiciary or the executive in the constitutional interpretation 
context.  These soft law tools thus form a much stronger foundation than 
exists in the statutory stare decisis or executive practice gloss contexts for a 
presumption that when Congress has left an agency statutory interpretation 
in place for years, its failure to object reflects congressional acquiescence in 
the interpretation. 
New empirical evidence based on interviews with congressional staffers 
supports this idea.  In a recent study, Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman found 
that the congressional staffers who draft statutory language view agencies, 
rather than courts, as the primary interpreters of statutes.136  Staffers 
reported paying significant attention to agency statutory interpretations, 
including to the longevity of an interpretation, and communicating with 
agencies about their interpretations after enactment.137  Staffers viewed 
judicial interpretation of statutes much more warily, calling them a “last 
resort.”138 
B.   Soundness 
A second theoretical assumption, related to acquiescence, that underlies 
statutory stare decisis and the use of historical practice in separation of 
powers cases is that an interpretation’s survival for a long period of time 
provides some evidence that it is sound, in the sense that it is workable.  
The Supreme Court has acknowledged this assumption in passing, 
observing that, “To be sure, agency interpretations that are of long standing 
come before us with a certain credential of reasonableness, since it is rare 
that error would long persist.”139  The assumption also is philosophically 
consistent with the Burkean preference for longstanding understandings and 
traditions that pervades much of the United States’ political and legal 
system.  Burkeanism values past practice in part because such practice is 
 136. Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons:  Part II, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 725, 728 (2014). 
 137. Id. at 38; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation and the Canons:  Part I, 
65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 1000 (2013). 
 138. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 136, at 773. 
 139. Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996) (emphasis added) 
(making this observation in passing in the context of an agency interpretation that was 
neither longstanding nor contemporaneous with the enactment of the relevant statute); see 
also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1965) (“[O]fficers, lawmakers, and citizens 
naturally adjust themselves to any longcontinued action of the Executive Department, on the 
presumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be so often repeated as 
to crystallize into a regular practice.” quoting United States v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 
472–73 (1915))). 
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believed to reflect a collective wisdom generated by the judgments and 
experiences of numerous actors over time.140 
As Thomas Merrill has noted, unworkable statutory interpretations 
generate discontent that may result in congressional overruling, or 
modification or repudiation by the court that initially offered the 
interpretation.  The fact that none of this has occurred is circumstantial 
evidence that the interpretation does not impose undue costs on regulated 
entities or frustrate the basic objectives of the proponents of the 
legislation.141 
In other words, the fact that multiple actors in multiple branches acting over 
a period of several years have left a statutory interpretation intact suggests 
that the interpretation is workable as a practical matter and performs well 
within—or at least is not inconsistent with—our legal and political system.  
The interpretation has been tested over time, in a variety of contexts, and 
has been found to be sound or, at least, good enough to leave in place.142  
This presumption of soundness also has much in common with the theory 
that the common law tends toward efficiency because inefficient rules will 
be challenged—and overturned—more often than efficient ones.143 
The presumption, moreover, applies at least equally to longstanding 
agency interpretations as it does to established judicial interpretations of 
statutes or established presidential practices regarding the constitutional 
separation of powers.  The various “soft law” tools that Congress possesses 
vis-à-vis administrative agencies provide numerous checks on agency 
interpretations and make it likely that problematic interpretations will be 
subjected to revision.  Even more importantly, agencies themselves have 
significant expertise and practical experience with the consequences of their 
statutory interpretations; if something is not working, they have ample 
opportunity and incentive to change the interpretation themselves.  Indeed, 
the administrative state is designed precisely to put expert regulators in 
charge both of interpreting and enforcing statutes—which means that if a 
statutory interpretation or implementation is not working well, agency 
personnel often will be the first to realize this and seek to fix the problem.  
 140. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE AND 
THE RIGHTS OF MAN (Dolphin ed. 1961) (1790).  For discussions about the influence that 
Burkean philosophy has had on constitutional interpretation see, for example, Thomas W. 
Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 509 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean 
Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353 (2006); Ernst Young, Rediscovering Conservatism:  
Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619 (1994). 
 141. Merrill, supra note 3, at 1018. 
 142. Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
877, 892 (1996) (advocating “common law constitutionalism,” an approach that involves an 
incremental interpretation of the Constitution in light of both judicial precedent and tradition 
and that is deferential to the “accumulated wisdom of many generations” and to practices 
that “have been tested over time, in a variety of circumstances, and have been found to be at 
least good enough”). 
 143. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good, 
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 260–61 (1979); George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the 
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 73–75 (1977); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the 
Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51, 53 (1977). 
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Conversely, where agency administrators familiar with the practical effects 
of an interpretation over the years have seen fit to leave that interpretation 
undisturbed for a decade or more, the administrators’ judgment serves as 
some evidence that the interpretation is a sound and workable one. 
C.   Institutional Competence 
Heightened stare decisis effect for judicial interpretations of statutes is 
also justified based on the notion that changes in a statutory interpretation 
are (or appear to be) more policy-based than initial interpretations, and that 
it is better for policy change to come from Congress than from the 
judiciary.  The reasoning is that a change in a longstanding statutory 
interpretation is tantamount to a new legal rule or policy, and it is 
inappropriate for courts rather than the legislature or the executive—i.e., the 
political branches—to impose new legal rules and policies.144  The 
argument, which builds on some of the insights of comparative institutional 
analysis,145 rests on an assumption that Congress, as an elected, political 
institution, is better situated than the courts to understand the costs that a 
change of policy will entail and to determine whether the benefits are worth 
the costs.  In other words, the judicial interpretation is treated as fixed 
because once a statutory meaning has been settled, the legislature is 
considered to be more institutionally competent than the judiciary to decide 
whether and when that meaning should be altered. 
This presumption of institutional competence is even stronger in the 
context of longstanding agency statutory interpretations.  In the case of such 
interpretations, the statute’s meaning has been settled by an agency rather 
than the courts, not simply because the agency was the first in time to 
construe the statute, but because the agency’s interpretation has been left in 
place and has controlled for several years.  Any judicial opinion that rejects 
a longstanding agency interpretation necessarily will work a change in 
statutory policy by undoing years of established agency practice.  As in the 
statutory stare decisis context, it follows that Congress is institutionally 
better situated than the courts to evaluate the costs associated with such 
switches in policy and to decide whether and when the costs are worth 
incurring.  Further, if Congress decides that a change in policy is 
appropriate, it can establish transition rules to mitigate any switching costs 
in a manner that courts cannot.  Thus, if Congress has not seen fit to 
 144. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 531 (1988) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting); Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1366; William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law 
Protection of Individuals’ Rights in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 975–76 
(1996) (“This conception of the judicial role acknowledges the lawmaking function of judges 
but simultaneously imposes restraints on their ability to craft new legal rules . . . out of 
respect for ‘the tenet of democratic theory that lawmakers should be accountable to the 
electorate.’” (quoting Edmund Ursin, Judicial Creativity and Tort Law, 49 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 229, 230 (1981)). 
 145. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:  CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN 
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (Univ. of Chi. Press 1994). 
 
1852 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
overrule an agency’s statutory interpretation, the courts should be reluctant 
to do so in its stead. 
More importantly, administrative agencies are themselves political, 
policymaking institutions.  Their statutory interpretations are to a large 
extent policy decisions.  From the realm of possible statutory constructions, 
agencies choose one that makes sense as a matter of available empirical 
data, executive branch political preferences, practical feasibility, and other 
similar considerations.146  The Court’s opinion in Chevron recognized as 
much, acknowledging throughout that agency administration of a statute 
involves “the formulation of policy,”147 “reconciling conflicting 
policies,”148 and reflects “the incumbent administration’s views of wise 
policy.”149  As policymaking institutions, agencies possess significant 
capacity to weigh the benefits against the costs created by a change in a 
longstanding statutory interpretation.  Courts, whose expertise is in legal 
analysis, are particularly ill-positioned to upset such agency decisions.  
Agencies also possess technical expertise and on-the-ground experience 
with the practical consequences of their statutory interpretations.  Thus, 
they are institutionally competent to make changes to their own 
longstanding statutory interpretations and any necessary changes can and 
should be expected to come from them.  Where, instead, an agency has 
stuck with an interpretation over several years, through changes in 
presidential administrations and attendant policy shifts, and after observing 
how the interpretation works in practice, that is significant and should give 
courts contemplating an override of the interpretation serious pause.  
Indeed, a judicial decision to reject an agency’s statutory interpretation 
under such circumstances amounts, as a practical matter, to a policy change 
imposed by the branch least competent to make such changes—over the 
heads of the other two branches.  This Article advocates affording 
precedential effect to longstanding agency interpretations in part as a 
mechanism for forcing courts to think seriously before imposing such 
policy changes. 
A more formal version of the institutional competence argument is the 
idea that a judicial interpretation becomes part of what the statute means in 
some fundamental sense—a statutory amendment, in effect—so that any 
change in the interpretation is legislative in nature and should come from 
Congress.  The Supreme Court articulated this view long ago, observing 
that a longstanding interpretation of a statute is “part of the warp and woof 
of the legislation” and should not be disturbed except by Congress.150  
Scholar Frank Horack elaborated upon the “warp and woof” idea, positing 
that 
 146. See Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. 
REV. 112, 141 (2011). 
 147. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 148. Id. at 865. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Francis v. S. Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1948). 
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when the decision is made the statute to that extent becomes more 
determinate, or, if you will, amended to the extent of the Court’s 
decision. . . . After the decision, whether the Court correctly or incorrectly 
interpreted the statute, the law consists of the statute plus the decision of 
the Court. . . .  Even assuming that the prior interpretation was incorrect, 
if the Court now reverses the position it took in the first case it is 
affirmatively changing an established rule of law under which society has 
been operating.  This is explicitly and unquestionably the exercise of a 
legislative function.151 
Horack further criticized judicial changes of interpretation on the ground 
that they occur “without any of the safeguards normally surrounding 
legislative action”—citing electoral accountability, bicameralism, 
presentment, and advance ventilation of interested parties’ opinions before 
Congress and the press as among those safeguards.152  This “effective 
amendment” version of the argument treats the initial interpretation as a 
part of the statute and insists not merely that changes in that interpretation 
should come from Congress (because of its superior institutional capacity 
for making policy decisions), but that any interpretive change must come 
from Congress in order to be legitimate. 
Shades of the “effective amendment” theory also appear in separation of 
powers cases involving historical executive practice–based “gloss” 
arguments.  In the 1990s, for example, some scholars and the Restatement 
of Foreign Relations took the position that congressional-executive 
agreements were interchangeable with Article II treaties because decades’ 
worth of post-World War II practice had treated them as such.153  Although 
other scholars disagreed with this interchangeability position substantively, 
almost all accepted the validity of looking to historical practice to help 
illuminate the issue.  Indeed, most of the scholarly disagreement was over 
the meaning of the relevant historical practice.154 
The “effective amendment” argument may not seem, at first blush, to 
apply neatly to agency statutory interpretations because—at least after 
Chevron—agency interpretations are subject to change by the agency itself, 
without congressional action.155  But in the case of longstanding agency 
statutory interpretations, which the agency has chosen not to override 
 151. Frank E. Horack, Jr., Congressional Silence:  A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 TEX. 
L. REV. 247, 250–51 (1947). 
 152. See id. at 251–52. 
 153. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 107, at 471 & n.264 (quoting Letter from Bruce 
Ackerman, Professor, Yale Law Sch., and David Golove, Professor, Univ. of Ariz. Coll. of 
Law, to William Clinton, President 3 (Sept. 21, 1994) (on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library)) (“After a half-century of successful use of the Congressional-Executive 
Agreement, it is far too late to question Congress’ powers under Article [I].”); id. at 470 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 303, cmt. e (1987)). 
 154. See id. at 469–70. 
 155. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 
(1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. . . .  [T]he agency, 
to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of 
its policy on a continuing basis.”). 
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despite its ability to do so, the agency’s interpretation, like a judicial 
interpretation, amounts to an established rule of law under which society 
operates.  It is part of the “warp and woof” of the public’s understanding of 
a statute, as translated into regulations, administrative rulings, or other 
agency action.  It also, of course, represents the executive branch’s 
longstanding practice under the relevant statute.  Judicially imposed 
changes to longstanding agency interpretations—after such interpretations 
have been in place for a decade or more—thus change the law, as a 
practical matter, as much as would an override of an initial judicial 
interpretation or a declaration that the executive branch’s historical practice 
is unconstitutional.  Moreover, judicial changes to longstanding agency 
interpretations, like judicial overrides of a court’s own prior statutory 
interpretations, occur without any of the procedural and accountability 
safeguards that exist when the legislature (and to some extent an agency 
itself)156 decides to alter an existing statutory interpretation.  When a court 
changes a longstanding agency construction, there is no electoral 
accountability, no interbranch consent akin to bicameralism or presentment, 
and little opportunity for interested parties to express their views about the 
change.157  Accordingly, the consequences of overturning longstanding 
agency interpretations that have “effectively amended” a statute are as 
significant as the consequences of overturning judicial interpretations of 
statutes or executive branch constitutional interpretations.  As such, 
longstanding agency interpretations too should be entitled to precedential 
effect—and judicial doctrine should impose a high bar before courts can 
reject such interpretations.  Agencies themselves, like Congress, should 
remain free to change their own longstanding interpretations, however, for 
the institutional competence reasons discussed above. 
D.   Reliance Interests 
Another significant justification underlying strict adherence to judicial 
precedent in general, and statutory stare decisis in particular, is that 
adherence to precedent promotes stability and predictability in the law and 
protects private and congressional reliance interests.  Private parties may, 
over time, shape their behavior around a judicial precedent such that a 
sudden or significant change in the applicable legal rule could be costly and 
unfair to them.  Similarly, Congress itself may rely on a judicial 
interpretation of a statute when formulating related legal rules.  That is, 
 156. In the rulemaking context, an agency change in interpretation requires notice and 
comment and thus provides for ventilation in a public forum, affording interested parties an 
opportunity to make their opinions known in advance of an interpretive change.  Interpretive 
changes made through adjudications or other agency policy channels do not necessarily offer 
such advance opportunities for ventilation, though interested parties may still be able to 
voice their opinions to agency officials through amicus briefs, petitions, or other 
communications with agency personnel after the change has been adopted—something that 
is not possible with a judicially imposed interpretive change since the judiciary does not 
have direct contact with those affected by its decisions. 
 157. Amicus briefs provide a limited forum for interested parties to voice their concerns, 
but they do not provide a public airing. 
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Congress may build upon the legal rule established by an existing judicial 
interpretation.158  Overruling an established judicial interpretation could, 
therefore, “unsettle a vast cluster of public and private expectations.”159 
Both of these reliance concerns are implicated by longstanding agency 
interpretations as well.  Private parties can and do shape their behavior 
around administrative regulations and adjudicative orders.  They arguably 
should be aware that agency policies can change, so that a well-ventilated, 
prospective change in an agency rule—one that occurs after a full notice-
and-comment procedure or with the benefit of other warnings, and that does 
not apply retroactively—might be fair game.  But a sudden, unexpected 
judicial rejection of a longstanding agency interpretation implicates all of 
the same private reliance concerns as an overruling of one of the Court’s 
own statutory precedents. 
Similarly, Congress is aware of existing agency practices and rules and 
sometimes shapes new statutes or amends existing ones to reflect 
longstanding agency interpretations.  In addition, other administrative 
agencies, both on the federal and state levels often shape their rules to work 
alongside the established, longstanding interpretation of an agency with 
jurisdiction over similar matters.160  In such cases, a court’s refusal to defer 
to a longstanding agency interpretation of a statute could upset multiple 
related legal frameworks. 
There is, of course, an important flip side to the reliance-based 
justification for adherence to statutory precedents:  the underrepresentation 
of certain groups in the legislative process and the possibility of agency 
capture.  As public choice scholarship has emphasized, interest groups 
influence much of the legislative—and administrative—agenda.161  
Moreover, our political system tends to respond best to wealthy, well-
organized interests and to ignore or pay little attention to the needs of 
disadvantaged and diffuse groups who lack political clout.162  These 
 158. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1367; Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal 
Reasoning, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 523–40 (1948). 
 159. See Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1367 (citing Levi, supra note 158, at 523–40). 
 160. Cf. Brief of the States of New York, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (Nos. 04-1034, 04-1384), 2006 WL 139208, 
at *3 [hereinafter Brief of 33 States] (urging the Court to uphold agency’s longstanding 
interpretation because “over the past three decades, the States have come to rely on the Clean 
Water Act’s core provisions and have structured their own water pollution programs 
accordingly”). 
 161. See, e.g., Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:  Incorporating the 
Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34–41 (1998). 
 162. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION  (Harvard Univ. Press 
1971); Croley, supra note 161, at 34–41; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The 
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 883–906 (1987) (discussing public 
choice theory in legislation); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts:  1967–
1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1050 (1997) (describing the tendency for administrative 
agencies to become captured by businesses they regulate at the expense of other groups); 
Jonathan R. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
50, 68 (1987); Sidney A. Shapiro, Keeping the Baby and Throwing Out the Bathwater:  
Justice Breyer’s Critique of Regulation, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 721, 722 (1995); Cass R. 
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political realities combine to create the possibility that (1) the reliance 
interests protected by deference to longstanding agency interpretations will 
be one-sided, and (2) neither the legislature nor the relevant administrative 
agency will be motivated to change a statutory interpretation that harms a 
diffuse or politically disadvantaged group.  In such cases, the institutional 
competence and soundness assumptions would be compromised and a 
judicial or agency statutory interpretation could be left in place for years—
becoming longstanding—despite having pernicious consequences.  Further, 
there is a danger that an agency might become beholden to wealthy interests 
under its regulatory jurisdiction and seek to adopt statutory interpretations 
that protect those interests at the expense of the interests of politically 
disadvantaged or unorganized groups.  These public choice insights raise 
important concerns about the appropriate scope of any presumption in favor 
of longstanding agency statutory interpretations.  But such concerns can be 
addressed, to some extent, by permitting the precedential effect of 
longstanding agency interpretations to be rebutted by evidence showing that 
a particular longstanding interpretation has had negative consequences for 
an underrepresented group.163 
*     *     * 
Notably, federal courts reviewing longstanding agency interpretations 
rarely discuss the theoretical assumptions elaborated above.  The one 
exception is legislative acquiescence, which is at least mentioned in over 
half the cases reviewed for this Article.164  Reliance, workability, and 
institutional competence arguments show up in only a handful of the 
cases.165  Because courts have failed to develop a coherent theory about 
how to treat longstanding agency interpretations, they are ignoring 
important factors in the judicial review of such interpretations.  One benefit 
of a more systemized approach, like the precedential effect proposed below 
in Part III, is that it should direct reviewing courts to focus on a consistent 
set of factors in deciding whether to uphold or reject a particular 
interpretation.166  Before turning to this Article’s proposed approach to the 
judicial review of longstanding agency interpretations, however, the next 
section seeks to understand why courts have adopted such strikingly 
different approaches to the judicial review of their own statutory precedents 
and longstanding executive practices in the constitutional arena than they 
have for the review of longstanding agency statutory interpretations. 
Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan?  Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 163, 219 (1992). 
 163. See infra Part III.B. 
 164. See Table 1 (thirty-five of sixty-six cases). 
 165. See Table 1 (reporting discussion of reliance interests in eleven cases, including 
three in which only parties’ briefs raised the issue; one case in which institutional 
competence was discussed; and three cases raising soundness or practical workability 
arguments). 
 166. For a list of factors that should cut against judicial deference to a longstanding 
agency interpretation, see discussion infra Part III and Table 3. 
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E.   Why the Dissonance? 
Here is the interpretive puzzle:  Why do federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court, treat judicial interpretations of statutes as super-strong 
precedents, entitled to heightened stare decisis effect but treat longevity in 
agency statutory interpretations as only a haphazard plus factor?  Likewise, 
why do courts give significant weight to historical executive practice in the 
constitutional context but tend to consider longstanding administrative 
practice only in passing or even to ignore it when reviewing agency 
statutory interpretations? 
This section offers three possible explanations for this interpretive 
dissonance.  Courts may, in part, be motivated by institutional politics, or a 
desire to preserve power over statutory meaning in the judiciary.  Relatedly, 
courts may view administrative agencies as inferior entities, whose 
decisions need to be checked and closely scrutinized by reviewing courts.  
Alternately, courts may be concerned about agency power grabs and view 
non-deferential review of even longstanding agency interpretations as a way 
to correct for such overreaching. 
First, at least some of the dissonance may be explained by institutional 
politics.  Treating longevity as a mere plus factor in the review of agency 
statutory interpretations maintains greater power in the judiciary relative to 
the agency.  Specifically, it gives courts the final say as to what the 
governing legal rule should be and the authority to set aside any agency 
interpretation with which a court disagrees.  When agencies interpret 
statutes, they do more than merely parse statutory language or 
congressional intent; they also engage in policy making.  That is, agencies 
choose a particular statutory interpretation after balancing several 
competing factors, including the political philosophy of the executive 
branch, current congressional preferences, empirical data about the effects 
of different policies, practical experiences, interest group dynamics, and so 
on.167  Courts are not experts in this kind of policy making and have a 
limited basis for overturning agency policy decisions.  Yet, when engaging 
in the judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, courts tend to 
ignore these policy considerations and paint agency statutory interpretation 
as primarily an exercise in legal, linguistic analysis—i.e., a search for the 
“correct reading” of a statute or the “intent of Congress”—rather than as the 
review of policy making by a coequal branch.168  They use language 
canons, sophisticated textual analysis, and judicially created substantive 
canons such as the federalism clear statement rule or the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of domestic laws to trump agency 
 167. See Mark Tushnet, Legislative and Executive Stare Decisis, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1339, 1351 (2008) (“Justice Stevens’ opinion in Chevron concludes by noting that 
determining what the law means (in the administrative law setting) implicates a combination 
of technical competence and political responsiveness.”). 
 168. Cf. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration:  How 
Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 
676 (2007) (criticizing the “confusing paradigm” whereby “agency implementation is 
synonymous with statutory construction”). 
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constructions—often without acknowledging the significant policy 
considerations that may have formed the basis for the agency’s selection of 
one interpretation over another.169 
As Randy Kozel and Jeffrey Pojanowski have pointed out, courts often 
fail to distinguish between different forms of reasoning that agencies may 
employ when exercising their regulatory authority, including their authority 
to interpret statutes.170  Specifically, Kozel and Pojanowski differentiate 
between “prescriptive reasoning,” in which an agency weighs evidence, 
utilizes technical expertise, and makes policy choices about what is best for 
society and “expository reasoning,” in which the agency engages in legal 
analysis, including evaluating congressional intent or the constraints 
imposed by prior judicial opinions in choosing among courses of action.171  
Kozel and Pojanowski’s focus is on administrative change—i.e., situations 
in which an agency changes its own rules or interpretations—but the 
distinction they articulate applies to the judicial review of longstanding 
agency interpretations as well.  In this latter context, I would argue that 
reviewing courts tend to ignore the extent to which agency interpretations 
of statutes are based on prescriptive reasoning and to treat such 
interpretations as though they are, or should be, based on expository 
reasoning.  Hence the judicial focus in many of these cases is on technical 
linguistic analysis and interpretive canons even when the agency itself has 
not based its construction on such grounds.172 
Recall, for example, Rapanos v. United States,173 the wetlands case.  In 
that case, a plurality of the Court was willing to overturn a thirty-year-old 
agency interpretation based on dictionary definitions, complicated whole 
act rule–based inferences, and two judicially created background policy 
norms (the federalism clear statement rule and the avoidance canon).174  In 
so doing, it rejected scientific findings and policy choices by the agency, 
legislative history suggesting congressional acquiescence in the agency’s 
interpretation, and the reliance interests of thirty-three states who filed a 
joint amicus brief urging the Court to uphold the agency’s interpretation 
because “over the past three decades, the States have come to rely on the 
Clean Water Act’s core provisions and have structured their own water 
 169. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 170. See Kozel & Pojanowski, supra note 146, at 147–150. 
 171. See id. 
 172. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by 
statute, Act of Sept. 25, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
 173. 547 U.S. 715 (2006). 
 174. Specifically, the Court held that the agency’s interpretation was inconsistent with the 
ordinary meaning of “waters” as reflected in dictionary definitions; was contradicted by the 
definition given to “point source” elsewhere in the statute; worked an unprecedented federal 
intrusion into the states’ traditional power over land and water use absent a clear and 
manifest statement from Congress authorizing such intrusion (federalism clear statement 
rule); and “stretche[d] the outer limits of Congress’s commerce power and raise[d] difficult 
questions about the ultimate scope of that power” that should be avoided if possible 
(avoidance canon). Id. at 732–736, 738. 
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pollution programs accordingly.”175  In other words, the Court used 
language and judicially created substantive canons to trump both the 
agency’s policy judgments and practical considerations such as state 
reliance interests. 
Importantly, an erratic approach to the judicial review of longstanding 
agency interpretations, of the kind described in Part I of this Article, is 
consistent with—and indeed enhances—judicial efforts to maintain power 
relative to administrative agencies.  There are three possible deference 
regimes that could govern the judicial review of longstanding agency 
statutory interpretations:  (1) no deference; (2) a presumption of deference 
or precedential effect; or (3) erratic deference such that courts sometimes 
give extra weight to longstanding interpretations, but other times do not.  
The judiciary benefits, as a matter of institutional power, from both the first 
and third approaches—no deference or erratic deference—perhaps more 
from erratic deference, because such a rule enables courts to pay lip service 
to agency expertise and policymaking superiority and to invoke an agency 
interpretation’s longevity when they want to uphold the interpretation, but 
to ignore or downplay longevity when they want to reject a longstanding 
agency interpretation.  That is, the current judicial approach to longstanding 
agency interpretations seems to be one that gives the judiciary discretion to 
reach whatever outcome it prefers. 
But even if institutional power dynamics explain the difference between 
how courts treat longstanding agency statutory interpretations versus prior 
judicial interpretations of statutes, they cannot explain why courts treat 
executive branch interpretations in the constitutional context differently 
from longstanding agency statutory interpretations.  After all, historical 
gloss treatment empowers the executive branch at the expense of the 
judiciary in the same way that precedential effect for longstanding agency 
interpretations would.  So why the disparate treatment of executive branch 
practices and interpretations?  One possibility is that courts view agencies 
as inferior institutions, rather than as coequal actors, whereas they view the 
President’s direct exercises of power under Article II of the Constitution as 
the work of a constitutional equal.  Such a view could have roots in the 
historical development of the administrative state.  Since its inception, 
courts have been obsessed with ensuring that the unelected fourth branch 
does not run roughshod over private citizens’ rights or usurp powers beyond 
those Congress confers on it.176  As a result, much of administrative law—
 175. Brief of 33 States, supra note 160, at *3 (emphasis added); see also Brief for 
Respondents, Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 546 U.S. 1162 (2006) (No. 04-1384), 
2006 WL 122118, at *25–28 [hereinafter Brief of U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs et al.] 
(describing Army Corps’s view that pollution of wetlands like those at issue “will typically 
threaten the quality of those adjacent waters” even when separated “by man-made dikes or 
barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes and the like”). 
 176. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:  
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 874 (2009) (“A central mission of 
administrative law is to design checks on agency overreaching.”). See generally RICHARD J. 
PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 79–226 (4th ed. 2004) (providing a 
general discussion of the statutory and judicial checks on administrative actions). 
 
1860 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
and judicial review of agency action in particular—focuses on checking the 
expansion of agency power or the exercise of agency power without 
adequate procedural safeguards.  Courts reviewing agency decision making 
often address questions such as:  Was the agency required to conduct a 
notice-and-comment proceeding before adopting the policy at issue?177  
Did the agency’s final rule adequately explain its basis and give reasons for 
rejecting proposed alternatives?178  Was the agency correct to deny this 
individual social security benefits?179  Did the agency provide adequate 
opportunity to be heard before (or after) terminating an individual’s 
disability benefits?180  In the course of answering such questions, reviewing 
courts tend to treat agencies as inferior institutions, subject to supervision 
and correction by the judiciary.  Presidential exercises of power under the 
Constitution, by contrast, may seem qualitatively different and more 
deserving of respect. 
One sign that federal courts view agencies as inferior institutional actors 
is that despite much surface rhetoric about agencies’ superior expertise in 
implementing statutes, reviewing courts tend to treat agency statutory 
interpretations more like the work of a trial court than like the work of a 
coequal branch.  Judicial review of agency statutory interpretations—
whether longstanding or not—essentially starts from scratch, with the same 
kind of text + canons + legislative history + purpose traditional interpretive 
analysis that appellate courts apply to the review of lower court statutory 
interpretations.  Indeed, both the Skidmore and Chevron Step One inquiries 
direct courts to engage in what is essentially de novo review of agency 
statutory interpretations.181  It is only at Chevron Step Two that reviewing 
courts actually defer to an agency’s superior expertise—and even then, they 
do so in a manner that parallels the “abuse of discretion” standard that 
governs appellate court review of trial court decision-making on matters 
with respect to which trial courts have particular expertise.182 
 177. See, e.g., Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996); Nat’l 
Family Planning and Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 228–29 (D.C. Cir. 
1992); Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1102 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 178. See, e.g., Reytblatt v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
 179. See, e.g., Tyler v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 989 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1993). 
 180. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976); Richardson v. Perales, 402 
U.S. 389, 400–02 (1971). 
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Haggar Apparel Co., 526 U.S. 380, 391 (1999) (finding 
that Chevron analysis is consistent with de novo judicial review of agency statutory 
interpretations); Agro Dutch Indus. Ltd. v. United States, 508 F.3d 1024, 1029–30 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (describing judicial review of agency interpretations as de novo within Chevron 
framework). 
 182. See, e.g., Wilson v. City of Lafayette, 510 F. App’x 775, 790 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(finding that abuse of discretion standard requires that plaintiffs “show that the district 
court’s decision ‘exceeded the bounds of the rationally available choices given the facts and 
the applicable law’” (quoting Big Sky Network Can., Ltd. v. Sichuan Provincial Gov’t, 533 
F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th Cir. 2008))); SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 
77 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that when employing an abuse of discretion 
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At least in the case of longstanding agency statutory interpretations, this 
treatment of agency decision making as equivalent to trial court decisions is 
inapt.  First, because of the structure of the administrative state, political 
incentives, and soft law tools that enable members of Congress to monitor 
and exert pressure on agency officials, longstanding agency statutory 
interpretations are subject to much more after-the-fact executive and 
congressional oversight than are lower court statutory constructions.183  
Second, the case or controversy requirement184 and high standards for en 
banc review in the circuit courts of appeal185 constrain lower courts’ ability 
to revise or correct their own statutory interpretations, even if the 
subsequent development of the law or changes in factual circumstances 
make clear that their original interpretation was wrong.  Administrative 
agencies, by contrast, have the power to revise their statutory interpretations 
in response to subsequent legal or factual developments.186  Third, lower 
courts lack the technical expertise and political accountability that agencies, 
as part of the executive branch, possess—so they are neither qualified nor 
free to make interpretive changes based on policy considerations in the way 
that agencies are.  As such, the fact that a lower court interpretation has 
endured may not signify much, whereas the fact than an agency statutory 
interpretation long has survived both congressional and executive branch 
oversight makes it quite likely that the interpretation reflects an underlying 
soundness and workability. 
Another possible explanation for the dissonance between judicial 
treatment of longstanding agency statutory interpretations versus prior 
judicial interpretations of statutes and executive branch constitutional 
practices is that courts may be using the power to reject longstanding 
agency interpretations to invalidate agency interpretations that expand the 
agency’s power or jurisdiction.  In other words, courts may be treating 
longstanding agency interpretations with less respect than other 
longstanding legal rules or practices because they want to retain the ability 
to reject such interpretations as a check on perceived administrative power 
grabs.  In Rapanos v. United States, for example, the plurality’s reading of 
the term “navigable waters” not to include wetlands that were adjacent and 
standard, courts “must affirm unless we at least determine that the district court has made ‘a 
clear error of judgment,’ or has applied an incorrect legal standard”). 
 183. See discussion supra Part II.A, C; see also James J. Brudney, Congressional 
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes:  Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 
MICH L. REV. 1, 7 & n.16 (1994) (arguing that “at least when lower court decisions are 
involved, Congress could not possibly modify or reject in text each statutory interpretation 
decision with which it has serious concerns and still have time to transact any other 
legislative business” and observing that courts of appeals decide over 20,000 cases each 
year, of which nearly 7000 are published). 
 184. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 
(2007); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (stressing that Article III limits 
federal courts to “deciding cases or controversies arising between opposing parties”). 
 185. See FED. R. APP. P. 35. 
 186. Such changes in agency interpretations are of course subject to judicial review for 
arbitrariness, and so do require some explanation from the agency. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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connected to navigable waters by a drain or river had the effect of limiting 
the universe of waters that the Army Corps of Engineers possessed 
jurisdiction to regulate.187  Similarly, in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, 
the Court’s conclusion that Title VII did not protect a U.S. citizen employed 
in the foreign offices of a U.S. corporation had the effect of limiting Title 
VII’s—and consequently, the EEOC’s and the Justice Department’s—
regulatory reach.188  And the Court’s decisions in Aaron v. SEC and SEC v. 
Sloan, interpreting the securities laws to require that the SEC establish 
scienter before it can enjoin private companies’ trading activities, and to 
prohibit the SEC from issuing a series of ten-day suspension orders to block 
improper trading practices, each limited the SEC’s regulatory power over 
private businesses.189  To the extent that a desire to check agencies’ power 
is part of the motivation behind federal courts’ failure to treat longstanding 
agency statutory interpretations as precedent, this Article submits that 
courts are acting improperly.  If Congress has left in place an agency 
construction that, among other things, expands the agency’s power, then as 
in the case of historical executive practice, that legislative failure to object 
should be respected by the judicial branch.  Congress, as author of the 
enabling statute and in its oversight capacity, has ample institutional 
incentives and tools available for curbing agency excesses.  Thus, where it 
has chosen not to cut back on an agency’s statutory reading for many years, 
and has allowed public and private reliance interests to build around that 
reading, then for all the reasons elaborated in this part, the courts should not 
disturb that settled state of affairs. 
III.   PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT FOR LONGSTANDING AGENCY STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATIONS 
In the abstract, almost everyone seems to agree that longstanding agency 
interpretations of statutes should receive heightened deference from 
courts.190  Numerous judicial opinions declare it to be so and scholars have 
assumed that judicial practice matches this rhetoric.191  But as Part I shows, 
judicial doctrine regarding longstanding agency interpretations is erratic and 
provides nothing close to precedential effect for such interpretations.  
Further, as Table 1 illustrates, federal courts often ignore the traditional 
theoretical assumptions that justify deference to established precedents 
when they review longstanding agency interpretations.192  The question 
thus becomes, how should courts approach the judicial review of 
longstanding agency interpretations so that legal doctrine can conform to 
prevailing intuitions, rhetoric, and practice in analogous legal contexts?  
This Article advocates that federal courts afford precedential effect, or a 
 187. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750–52 (2006). 
 188. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 277–78 (1991). 
 189. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701–02 (1980); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 106 
(1978). 
 190. See supra note 5. 
 191. See supra notes 31–32. 
 192. For example, very few cases contain any mention of reliance interests. 
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presumption of correctness, to longstanding agency interpretations that is 
similar to the basic presumption of correctness enjoyed by ordinary judicial 
precedents.  The Article does not advocate the equivalent of statutory stare 
decisis—i.e., a “super strong presumption of correctness”—for 
longstanding agency interpretations, but only a presumption of accuracy 
similar to the presumption that applies to ordinary, non-statutory judicial 
precedents. 
Importantly, this Article does not advocate that reviewing courts impose 
such a presumption of correctness when an agency wishes to revise or reject 
its own longstanding statutory interpretation.  Although it might seem, at 
first blush, that precedential effect for longstanding agency interpretations 
should apply equally whether it is the agency or a court that seeks to 
overturn the interpretation, I believe that constraining agency-driven 
interpretive changes in this manner would be a mistake.  When an agency 
seeks to change its own longstanding interpretation of a statute, the 
theoretical assumptions supporting precedential effect for that interpretation 
largely disappear.  Institutional competence concerns, for example, point in 
favor of allowing expert agencies to revise their prior statutory 
interpretations in light of their practical experiences implementing the 
interpretation over the years and in light of modern developments.  
Similarly, the assumption of soundness is directly contradicted when the 
agency in charge of administering the interpretation determines that there 
are good reasons for revising a longstanding interpretation.  Legislative 
acquiescence, too, becomes uncertain when the agency seeks to change its 
own interpretation because the agency’s revised reading may well reflect 
congressional approval or even pressure to change an interpretation.  
Reliance interests would remain an important consideration when an agency 
seeks to change its own longstanding interpretation, but agencies are better 
positioned than courts to balance competing interests and to make the 
judgment that the costs of an interpretive change are outweighed by its 
benefits.  Moreover, so long as agencies provide fair warning of an 
interpretive change, as through a notice-and-comment period or even a 
transition phase, those who have relied on a longstanding interpretation can 
be given time to adjust to the new interpretation—in a way not possible 
when a court rejects a longstanding interpretation without warning. 
At bottom, because agency statutory interpretations typically involve 
policymaking—including expert weighing of costs and benefits, evaluation 
of changing empirical data, and responsiveness to changes in congressional 
or presidential political preferences—rather than merely legal analysis, 
agencies should be allowed to change their own interpretations when they 
deem such change appropriate.  Indeed, the case for according precedential 
effect to longstanding agency interpretations would be much diminished 
absent agency freedom to make such interpretive changes.  If agencies 
lacked the power to change interpretations they found unworkable, then the 
fact that a particular interpretation had endured for years would not 
necessarily reflect an executive branch judgment of soundness or practical 
feasibility. 
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Part III.A outlines the basic manner in which the proposed precedential 
effect for longstanding agency statutory interpretations should work.  Part 
III.B discusses limited grounds on which such interpretations should be 
subject to judicial rejection, drawing from the grounds on which ordinary 
judicial precedents may be overruled.  Part III.C explores how courts should 
proceed when reviewing an agency’s attempt to reverse its own 
longstanding reading of a statute. 
A.   Basics 
This Article advocates that federal courts follow a three-step approach to 
reviewing longstanding agency interpretations.  First, courts should 
determine how long an agency interpretation has been in effect.  If an 
interpretation has been in effect for more than ten years, it should be 
entitled to a presumption of correctness.  Second, courts should determine 
whether the interpretation is “clearly erroneous”; if so, then they may reject 
the interpretation despite its longevity.  Third, it may make sense to require 
that a supermajority of the judges reviewing a longstanding agency 
interpretation find the interpretation to be “clearly erroneous” before the 
interpretation may be rejected.  This section explores the practical and 
theoretical justifications for each of these steps in detail. 
In the common law, precedent works essentially as follows:  rules 
established in prior decisions are presumed to be sound and courts 
confronted with such rules consider themselves bound to follow them, 
suspending the balancing of interests and weighing of policy outcomes that 
they ordinarily would engage in if starting from a blank slate.193  Prior rules 
can be overturned under certain circumstances, but such overrulings are 
disfavored and courts take special pains to justify them.194  Precedential 
effect for longstanding agency statutory interpretations should work in a 
similar manner.  As a threshold matter, federal courts reviewing agency 
statutory interpretations should pay specific attention to how long an 
agency’s interpretation has been in effect.  If the interpretation is 
longstanding, it should be entitled to a default presumption of correctness 
and deference.  The precise number of years necessary to qualify an 
interpretation as longstanding can and should be debated; this Article 
 193. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 19–20 
(Yale Univ. Press 1962) (1921); Hon. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of 
Empirical Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate 
Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1897 (2009) (“If precedent controls the disposition of a 
pending case, appellate judges must follow it.  It does not matter whether an appellate judge 
agrees with established precedent; we are bound to apply established precedent in deciding 
cases before us.”). 
 194. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“[W]e have always 
required a departure from precedent to be supported by some ‘special justification.’” 
(quoting United States v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 856 (1996))); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (precedents may be overruled for 
“only the most convincing justification”); cf. Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1363 (noting that 
when the Supreme Court overrules a statutory precedent, “the Court normally does not 
completely admit what it is doing, or goes to great length to explain its overruling”). 
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proposes ten years as a starting point for discussion rather than as a magic 
number.  Other possibilities include using fifteen years as a benchmark; 
making longevity turn on whether the interpretation has been in force 
during both Republican and Democratic administrations; or measuring 
longevity in proportion to how long the agency itself has been in 
existence.195  As Table 1 shows, the vast majority of the cases reviewed for 
this Article involved agency interpretations that had been in effect for at 
least ten years (sixty of sixty-six cases); and fifty-three of the sixty-six 
reviewed cases involved interpretations that had been in effect for at least 
fifteen years.196  All but three of the sixty-six cases reviewed involved 
interpretations that survived both Democratic and Republican presidential 
administrations.  This data suggests that the precise location of the cut-off 
point for deeming an agency interpretation “longstanding” is unlikely to 
significantly affect the number of interpretations deemed to qualify, nor is a 
requirement that an interpretation have remained in effect through both 
Democratic and Republican presidential administrations.  Wherever the 
lines are drawn, once an agency interpretation has been identified as 
longstanding, courts should presume that it is correct and uphold it unless 
they find the interpretation to be “clearly erroneous.” 
I suggest a “clearly erroneous” standard of review because it is a 
“significantly deferential”197 standard that nevertheless leaves room for 
judicial correction of clear mistakes.  Although most commonly associated 
with appellate court review of trial court factual findings, the “clearly 
erroneous” standard also is used as a ground for overruling legal 
determinations otherwise protected under the law of the case doctrine.198  In 
the context of longstanding agency statutory interpretations, the standard 
should operate to allow the overruling of an agency’s interpretation only if 
the reviewing court determines that the agency’s interpretation is 
demonstrably wrong—i.e., constitutes an implausible reading of the 
statutory provision at issue.199  It should not be enough for the court to 
conclude that another statutory reading would make greater sense or be a 
better fit with the statute’s language. 
 195. The latter was one of the bases used in Eskridge and Baer’s and Eskridge and Raso’s 
empirical studies in classifying “longstanding and fairly stable” interpretations. See Eskridge 
& Baer, supra note 5, at 1206–07; Raso & Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1775 & n.192. 
 196. See Table 1. 
 197. Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 623 
(1993). 
 198. The law of the case doctrine states that the decision of an appellate court on a legal 
issue must be followed in all subsequent proceedings in the same case unless one of three 
“exceptional circumstances” exists; one of these circumstances is when a “decision is clearly 
erroneous and its enforcement would work a manifest injustice.” In re Rainbow Magazine, 
Inc., 77 F.3d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1475 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
 199. This is consistent with how the standard is applied in other contexts. See, e.g., 
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982) (stating that appellate courts 
must accept trial courts’ findings unless “left with the ‘definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed’” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 
395 (1948))). 
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Moreover, in determining whether the interpretation is clearly erroneous, 
courts should not employ the full arsenal of statutory interpretation tools 
that they would bring to bear if starting from scratch to construe the statute; 
rather, just as common law courts suspend their traditional policy analysis 
when confronting a precedent, courts reviewing longstanding agency 
statutory interpretations should suspend their traditional balancing of 
interpretive tools.  Specifically, courts should look only for clear 
incompatibility between an agency’s interpretation and the statute’s text, 
and should avoid using complex language canons or substantive canons to 
trump a statutory reading that has been the governing legal rule for a decade 
or more. 
Although eliminating language and substantive canons from the judicial 
review of longstanding agency interpretations may sound radical, it is a 
necessary step to providing longstanding agency interpretations with 
meaningful precedential effect—and one with some support in existing case 
law.  Language and substantive canons are not definitive guides to statutory 
meaning, and both allow for substantial judicial discretion in application.200  
Language canons, for example, are supposed to be aids to a statute’s most 
likely meaning, not ironclad rules.201  They provide a background set of 
inferences based on logic and patterns, not clear-cut evidence of statutory 
meaning.  And they are supposed to come into play “only when there is 
some uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute.”202  
But if there is uncertainty as to the meaning of statutory language, then an 
administrative agency’s longstanding interpretation of that language cannot 
 200. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 138 (2001) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (“Like many interpretive canons, however, ejusdem generis is a fallback, and if 
there are good reasons not to apply it, it is put aside.”); United States v. Amato, 540 F.3d 
153, 160 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Ejusdem generis has its limits.  Like other canons of statutory 
construction, it is simply a helpful guide to legislative intent, not a dispositive one, and it 
does not require a court to give it unthinking reliance.” (quoting Ali v. Fed. Bureau of 
Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 224–27 (2008))); Levy v. Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 508 
n.12 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Canons of interpretation are not mandatory rules.  They are guides that 
‘need not be conclusive.’” (quoting Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 
(2001))); In re Sealed Case No. 97–3112, 181 F.3d 128, 132 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (recognizing 
that the legal maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius “is not always correct”); Matter of 
Beltran, 20 I. & N. Dec. 521, 526 n.12 (1992) (reliability of expressio unius canon might be 
questioned to the extent “it stands on the faulty premise that all possible alternative or 
supplemental provisions were necessarily considered and rejected by the legislative 
draftsmen” (quoting Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 
1973)); Caleb Nelson, Statutory Interpretation and Decision Theory, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 329, 
349 (2007) (describing substantive canons as a response to the ambiguity inherent in 
statutory interpretation, “designed to guide judges when the available information about 
intended meaning has run out”). 
 201. See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 581 (1981) (“The rule of ejusdem 
generis is no more than an aid to construction and comes into play only when there is some 
uncertainty as to the meaning of a particular clause in a statute.”); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, 
JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:  
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 854 (4th ed. 2007). 
 202. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 581; Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588 (1980); 
United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91 (1975); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 128 
(1936). 
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be “clearly erroneous” and should be especially deserving of judicial 
deference.  That is, where a statute has more than one plausible meaning, 
the case for deference to an agency’s longstanding choice among meanings 
is particularly strong. 
Moreover, at least some language canons—for example, ejusdem generis 
and noscitur a sociis—require courts to make a judgment call about what it 
is that makes the items in a list or series similar.203  Unsurprisingly, judges 
regularly disagree as to what the relevant common denominator should be 
when applying these canons, with both dissenting and majority opinions 
claiming consistency with the same language canon.204  Yet despite the 
discretion inherent in their application, judges sometimes treat language 
canons as dispositive trump cards when reviewing agency statutory 
interpretations.  In Babbitt v. Sweet Home, for example, Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion placed significant weight on the noscitur a sociis canon 
in concluding that the statutory term “take” covered only deliberate, direct 
harm to endangered species; the majority opinion in the D.C. Circuit, which 
the Court reversed over Justice Scalia’s dissent, likewise relied significantly 
on this canon.205  Because language canons do not provide certainty about 
statutory meaning, they should not be used to demonstrate “clear” error in a 
longstanding agency interpretation.  Indeed, allowing courts to use language 
canons to trump a longstanding agency statutory interpretation is just 
another way of empowering judicial preferences about the best statutory 
 203. Noscitur a sociis translates as “it is known by its associates.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1224 (10th ed. 2014).  The canon “hold[s] that the meaning of an unclear word 
or phrase, esp[ecially] one in a list, should be determined by the words immediately 
surrounding it.” Id.  Ejusdem generis translates as “of the same kind or class.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 631 (10th ed. 2014).  It directs that “when a general word or phrase follows a 
list of specifics, the general word will be interpreted to include only items of the same class 
as those listed.” Id. 
 204. See, e.g., James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 199, 218 (2007) (majority and 
dissent both invoke ejusdem generis canon); Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486–
87, 495 (2006) (majority and dissent both claim consistency with noscitur a sociis canon); 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 702, 721 (1995) 
(majority and dissent both rely on noscitur a sociis canon); Estate of Braden ex rel. 
Gabaldon v. State, 266 P.3d 349, 352, 356 (Ariz. 2011) (majority and dissent both claim 
consistency with ejusdem generis canon). 
 205. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 721; Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. v. Babbitt, 
17 F.3d 1463, 1465–66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (majority opinion in lower court relies on noscitur a 
sociis to reject longstanding agency interpretation); see also, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain 
Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1337–38 (2011) (dissent uses three other 
protected activities in statutory list to attribute characteristics to phrase at issue and to argue 
for rejection of agency interpretation); Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438, 449 & 450 n.6 
(2010) (majority relies in part on grammar canons and substantive canon regarding 
retroactivity to reject agency interpretation); Global Crossing Telecomms. v. Metrophones 
Telecomms. Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 75–76 (2007) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion 
would have rejected agency interpretation based in part on argument that “a word ‘is known 
by the company it keeps’” (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995))); 
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 120 (2007) (dissent would have 
upset longstanding agency construction based in part on an expressio unius argument about 
Education Finance Incentive Program in the same statute); Limited, Inc. v. Comm’r of IRS, 
286 F.3d 324, 333–37 (6th Cir. 2002) (relying on noscitur a sociis and rejecting agency 
interpretation). 
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meaning to displace legal rules that have governed, with the implicit 
sanction of both the legislative and executive branches, for years.  Some 
reviewing courts have recognized as much, observing that certain language 
canons should have reduced effect in the administrative context, where 
Congress has delegated to agencies the discretion to give meaning to 
statutory text.206  But it is time for this recognition to become the 
established interpretive rule, at least with respect to the judicial review of 
longstanding agency statutory interpretations. 
Substantive canons also introduce substantial judicial discretion into the 
interpretive analysis.207  Unlike language canons, which at least purport to 
constitute objective guides to meaning, substantive canons are policy-based, 
in effect “loading the dice” in favor of a particular outcome.208  Moreover, 
like language canons, they are supposed to be invoked only when a statute’s 
meaning is ambiguous or uncertain.209  If a statute’s meaning is uncertain, 
however, the court should defer to the agency’s longstanding 
interpretation—not search for interpretive tools that justify rejecting the 
agency’s construction. 
 206. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 97, 102 (2002) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that “expressio unius ought to have somewhat reduced 
force in th[e] context” of statute authorizing agency to “‘prescribe such regulations as are 
necessary to carry out’ the Act”); Babbitt, 17 F.3d at 1475 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting) 
(questioning whether “it is ever appropriate to measure an agency’s construction of a statute 
against a seldom-used and indeterminate principle of statutory construction” such as noscitur 
a sociis), overruled by Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687; Cheney R.R. v. I.C.C., 902 F.2d 66, 69 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (“Whatever its general force, we think [expressio unius] is an especially feeble 
helper in an administrative setting, where Congress is presumed to have left to reasonable 
agency discretion questions that it has not directly resolved.”). 
 207. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 201, at 1020 (describing 
substantive canons as “famously malleable”); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005). 
 208. See, e.g., The Supreme Court 2007 Term:  Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L REV. 276, 
474 n.72 (2008); Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:  The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in ANTONIN A. 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 28–29 (Amy 
Gutman ed., 1997).  Examples include the rule of lenity, a due-process based canon dictating 
that when a criminal statute is ambiguous it should be construed in favor of the defendant; 
the federalism clear statement rule, which directs that unless Congress clearly expresses its 
intent to infringe on state rights in the text of a statute, the statute must not be interpreted to 
interfere with state functions, laws, or processes; and the presumption that federal law is not 
meant to have extraterritorial effect. See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 
247, 264–65 (2010) (extraterritorial application of U.S. law); Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 
541 U.S. 125, 1564 (2004) (federalism clear statement); BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 
U.S. 531, 544 (1994) (federalism clear statement); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 289 
(1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rule of lenity); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359 
(1987) (rule of lenity). 
 209. See, e.g., In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610, 628 n.15 (Tenn. 2009) 
(“Substantive canons provide presumptions for interpreting ambiguous statutes that 
explicitly consider the substance of the law being interpreted.”); Nelson, supra note 200, at 
349 (noting that substantive canons “are designed to guide judges when the available 
information about intended meaning has run out—when the judges’ primary interpretive 
tools have succeeded only in identifying a range of possible meanings, none of which seems 
significantly more likely than the others to reflect what members of the enacting legislature 
probably had in mind”). 
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There is a further reason why substantive canons should be eliminated 
from the judicial review of longstanding agency statutory interpretations:  
they reflect presumptions about congressional drafting that should be 
displaced by the practical concerns and assumptions discussed in Part II of 
this Article.  Specifically, substantive canons reflect background policy 
norms that courts presume Congress to be aware of and to legislate in 
conformance with.  So when a court uses such canons to reject an agency’s 
statutory construction, it is not saying that Congress has expressed a clear 
intent contradicting the agency’s interpretation but, rather, that the agency’s 
interpretation must be presumed to contradict Congress’s intent because it 
conflicts with a background norm of which Congress must have been 
aware.210  In the case of longstanding agency interpretations, however, such 
judicially created background norms that Congress is presumed to legislate 
around should be suspended in favor of a different background 
presumption—i.e., a presumption that interpretations left in effect for 
several years are sound, workable, have created reliance interests, and 
reflect the implicit approval of Congress and the executive branch.  In other 
words, in cases where judicially created policy norms might tip the balance 
if courts were interpreting the statute from scratch, the agency’s (i.e., 
executive branch’s) longstanding construction and experience and 
Congress’s implicit approval—or at least failure to object—should trump 
the judiciary’s vision of the best possible statutory interpretation. 
This Article’s proposal that courts defer to longstanding agency 
interpretations without employing traditional language and substantive 
canons also is supported by key findings in Gluck and Bressman’s study of 
congressional staffers, which revealed that the legislative counsel who draft 
most statutory language (1) are unaware of or reject many of the canons 
used by courts211 and (2) consider agencies, rather than courts, to be the 
primary interpreters of statutes.212  If language and substantive canons are 
considered authoritative because they supposedly reflect how Congress uses 
language and background norms of which Congress supposedly is aware, 
then Gluck and Bressman’s findings significantly undermine the 
authoritativeness of such canons.  Moreover, these findings suggest that 
courts concerned with fidelity to congressional design should not lightly 
overturn agency interpretations. 
Finally, it might make sense to impose a supermajority voting 
requirement for judicial determinations that a longstanding agency 
interpretation is “clearly erroneous.”  Jacob Gersen and Adrian Vermeule 
have suggested a rule by which all agency statutory interpretations should 
be upheld unless a supermajority of the judges on a reviewing court finds 
the agency’s reading to be incorrect (e.g., six-to-three on the Supreme 
 210. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 201, at 883 (describing 
substantive canons as “presumptions or rules of thumb that cut across different types of 
statutes and statutory schemes” and that “represent policies that the Court will ‘presume’ 
Congress intends to incorporate into statutes”). 
 211. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 137, at 931–48. 
 212. Bressman & Gluck, supra note 136, at 728. 
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Court, three-to-zero on the courts of appeals).213  Whatever one thinks of 
the merits of such proposals as applied to all agency statutory 
interpretations, it could make considerable sense to require that 
longstanding agency interpretations of statutes may be deemed “clearly 
erroneous” only if a supermajority of the reviewing judges agrees that the 
interpretation is demonstrably wrong. 
*     *     * 
Readers may wonder where the proposed precedential effect for 
longstanding agency interpretations would fit within the framework of 
current deference tests for the general review of agency statutory 
interpretations.  This Article advocates that the proposed precedential effect 
should supersede existing deference tests and constitute its own 
independent standard for judicial review of longstanding agency 
interpretations.  There are several reasons why such an approach makes 
sense.  First, recent empirical studies provide strong evidence (1) that the 
Supreme Court often does not adhere to its own deference tests—declining, 
notably, to invoke Chevron in cases where it clearly is applicable;214 and 
(2) that federal courts tend to defer to agencies at roughly equal rates 
irrespective of which deference test or standard they use.215  The emerging 
consensus seems to be that courts review agency statutory interpretations 
for rationality, or reasonableness, not according to strict deference tests or 
guidelines.216  If courts do not apply existing deference regimes in any 
systematic matter, then there is little to gain from situating precedential 
effect for longstanding interpretations within those existing regimes. 
Moreover, even if courts were in the habit of adhering to existing 
deference regimes and tests, this Article argues that longstanding agency 
interpretations raise different institutional, political, and reliance concerns 
than do other agency interpretations—and that they do so in a way that legal 
doctrine should allow for.  Subjecting longstanding agency interpretations 
to traditional deference regimes would leave too much discretion with 
courts to use language and substantive canons to reject established agency 
constructions, and thus would fail to provide meaningful precedential effect 
for such interpretations.  Thus, the proposed precedential effect for 
 213. See Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 
676, 679, 684–86 (2007). 
 214. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 5, at 1124–25 (finding Chevron cited in only 28.5 
percent of cases in which it should be applicable); Raso & Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1797. 
 215. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 137 (2010). 
 216. See, e.g., Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes:  
An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 256 n.10 (1988) (suggesting that the 
Chevron two-step test can be collapsed into a rule that courts must respect an agency’s 
reasonable interpretation of its organic statute); Erika Jones et al., Developments in Judicial 
Review with Emphasis on the Concepts of Standing and Deference to the Agency, 4 ADMIN. 
L.J. 113, 123–24, 126 (1990) (remarks of the Hon. Stephen F. Williams suggesting that he 
applies Chevron as a single inquiry); Stephenson & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 598; see also 
Global Crossing Telecomms. v. Metrophones Telecomms., 550 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2007) 
(concluding that the agency’s interpretation was “reasonable . . . [and] hence . . . lawful” 
with little discussion of Chevron). 
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longstanding agency statutory interpretations, which could be referred to as 
“longevity deference” or an independent “longevity rule,” should take the 
place of the Mead-Chevron-Skidmore regime and kick in immediately once 
an agency interpretation is determined to be longstanding. 
B.   Some Grounds for Overruling 
The presumption of correctness for longstanding agency interpretations 
advocated in this Article should not, however, be absolute.  Ordinary 
judicial precedents can be overruled under certain circumstances and such 
circumstances, at a minimum, also should justify the overruling of 
longstanding agency statutory interpretations.  In addition, if the theoretical 
assumptions on which precedential effect for longstanding interpretations is 
based—e.g., acquiescence—do not hold in the case of a particular 
longstanding agency interpretation, the presumption of correctness should 
be rebutted with respect to that interpretation.  This section explores factors 
that might limit a longstanding interpretation’s claim to precedential effect 
and outlines corresponding grounds on which the interpretation should be 
subject to overruling. 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,217 the Supreme Court provided a list of 
“prudential and pragmatic considerations” designed to “gauge the 
respective costs of reaffirming [versus] overruling” an ordinary judicial 
precedent.218  It noted, for example, that rejection of a precedent may be 
appropriate where the prior rule “has proven to be intolerable simply in 
defying practical workability” or has not been “subject to a kind of reliance 
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling”; or 
where “related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the 
old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine”; or where “facts 
have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the 
old rule of significant application or justification.”219  These grounds for 
overruling parallel many of the theoretical assumptions discussed in Part II 
that justify providing precedential effect for longstanding agency 
interpretations.  The workability ground, for example, is a natural corollary 
to the assumption that longstanding agency interpretations reflect years of 
executive branch experience and a judgment that an agency’s construction 
is sound.220  If a party challenging a longstanding agency interpretation can 
show that this assumption does not hold for that interpretation—perhaps by 
demonstrating that the interpretation has proved unpredictable, has 
confused regulated parties or administrators, has led to instability, or that 
technological advances have rendered the interpretation obsolete—then it 
 217. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 218. Id. at 854. 
 219. Id. at 854–55 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173–174 
(1989); Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 116 (1965); Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas 
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); United States v. Title Ins. & Trust 
Co., 265 U.S. 472, 486 (1924)). 
 220. See supra Part II.B. 
 
1872 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
makes sense that this showing of unworkability should constitute a ground 
for overruling the interpretation. 
Similarly, the Casey exception for legal or factual developments that 
render a precedent outmoded is a natural check, or backstop, to the 
assumption that Congress and administrative agencies are institutionally 
more competent than courts to update statutory interpretations in light of 
new political, technological, and legal or regulatory developments.221  
Where a challenging party can show that an administrative agency (and 
Congress) has failed to update an interpretation to reflect factual or legal 
developments, it makes sense for precedential effect to give way and for 
courts to consider overruling a longstanding agency interpretation.  Finally, 
assumptions about public and private reliance on settled interpretations play 
a key role in justifying precedential effect for longstanding legal rules,222 so 
it makes sense for courts to allow an exception or relaxation of precedential 
effect where it can be shown that significant reliance interests or hardship 
are not implicated by a particular longstanding agency interpretation. 
There are also two other grounds that arguably should serve as 
justifications for overruling a longstanding agency interpretation, based on 
the theoretical assumptions discussed in Part II.  First, much of the 
argument in favor of giving precedential effect to longstanding agency 
interpretations rests on the fact that such interpretations have survived both 
executive and congressional oversight over several years.  This rationale 
depends, however, on the interpretation’s salience or visibility within the 
executive branch and to Congress.  If an agency interpretation was first 
rendered thirty years ago, but appeared only in an obscure agency 
adjudication order that has since been ignored, or in an interpretive letter 
issued to a private party that has languished unnoticed in the agency’s files, 
then it is not likely to reflect an executive branch judgment of soundness or 
workability—nor is it likely to have been subjected to congressional 
review.223  Thus, lack of visibility also should constitute a ground on which 
the presumption of correctness can be rebutted.  That is, if those 
challenging a longstanding agency interpretation can present evidence 
showing that the interpretation is an obscure one or that Congress or agency 
higher-ups were unaware of the interpretation over the years, then the 
 221. See supra Part II.C. 
 222. See supra Part II.D. 
 223. Incidentally, these examples illustrate why Mead’s formality inquiry is an 
inadequate measure of the level of deference to which an interpretation should be entitled; 
interpretations arrived at through formal adjudication can lack visibility, while those 
announced in an informal interpretive letter can become highly visible. See, e.g., Air Brake 
Sys., Inc. v. Mineta, 357 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2004) (National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) publishes an interpretive letter stating that manufacturer’s product 
does not meet safety standards on NHTSA website, manufacturer seeks injunction to have 
letter removed from website); cf. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 201–02 (advocating replacing Mead Step Zero inquiry 
with inquiry tying deference to the place in agency hierarchy of the official responsible for 
the interpretation). 
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presumption should not apply.224  The agency interpretation at issue in 
United States v. Mead could have been faulted on precisely this ground:  
because it was set forth in a Customs Service ruling letter issued to a private 
party, it is highly unlikely that Congress would have been aware of the 
interpretation.225 
Second, in order to counteract the legislative process’s inherent tendency 
toward underrepresentation of diffuse and politically powerless groups and 
related concerns about agency capture, the presumption of correctness for 
longstanding agency interpretations could be made rebuttable on a showing 
that an interpretation harms a politically weak or underrepresented group.  
The theory behind such an exception would be that longstanding 
interpretations that reflect incomplete executive or legislative information, 
or worse, executive or legislative branch indifference to the interests of 
certain groups, cannot be presumed sound or practically workable.  
Allowing such a ground for rejecting a longstanding agency interpretation 
admittedly could complicate the judicial review of longstanding agency 
interpretations significantly, forcing courts to engage in difficult line-
drawing exercises to determine what makes a group “politically weak or 
underrepresented” and what constitutes “harm” to such groups.226  But any 
attempt to address disparities in political access will face such definitional 
and categorizing difficulties.  Moreover, recognizing an 
“underrepresentation” ground for rejecting longstanding agency 
interpretations is perhaps the most direct way to ensure that judicial review 
of longstanding agency statutory interpretations takes into account the 
interests of politically disadvantaged groups—who are left entirely out of 
current deference regimes—and to counteract the possibility that giving 
precedential effect to longstanding agency interpretations might exacerbate 
existing disparities in political access. 
 224. For agency interpretations adopted through informal rulemaking (including policy 
statements, interpretative rules, and guidance manuals), see supra note 80.  Of course, the 
CRA’s notice requirements ensure that Congress is made aware of the agency interpretation, 
so the visibility of such interpretations should be high.  But many agency interpretations are 
adopted through other means, such as opinion letters that apply only to the parties addressed 
in the letter or internal agency memoranda or informal letters between government actors.  In 
EEOC v. Arabian American Oil, for example, the interpretation at issue had been set forth by 
two different agencies in three different forms:  (1) a letter sent by the EEOC’s General 
Counsel to an individual senator, (2) an EEOC Policy Statement, and (3) DOJ testimony 
before Congress. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 275–76 (1991).  Each of 
these forms of communication is subject to different levels of congressional and executive 
visibility; neither the full Congress nor the President necessarily would see the General 
Counsel’s letter to one senator, whereas the Justice Department’s testimony before Congress 
would have been accessible to all members of Congress and to the President. 
 225. Since visibility is not part of the Court’s current deference analysis, the factual 
record regarding the notoriety of the Customs ruling letter was not developed in Mead.  The 
Court did, however, emphasize that the ruling was not the product of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. See United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 229–231 (2001). 
 226. For a proposal to fix the problem at its roots, see generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, 
Representation Reinforcement:  A Legislative Process Solution to a Legislative Process 
Problem, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2009). 
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Finally, longstanding agency interpretations, like statutes themselves, 
would of course remain subject to constitutional review by the courts and 
could be struck down as unconstitutional. 
Notably, the Casey traditional grounds for overruling an established legal 
precedent receive almost no mention in the cases reviewed for this Article.  
In fact, only three out of sixty-six reviewed cases contained any mention of 
these grounds:  one case involved an argument, raised in the challenging 
party’s brief, that the agency’s interpretation was out of step with 
subsequent legal developments;227 another case explicitly mentioned 
changed factual circumstances as a justification for overturning the 
agency’s longstanding interpretation;228 and in the third case, a dissenting 
opinion argued that the agency interpretation lacked visibility.229 
One of this Article’s goals is to counter judicial inattention to factors that 
might justify the overruling of a longstanding agency interpretation; if 
federal courts come to treat longstanding agency interpretations like other 
legal precedents, it is hoped that they might begin to focus their deference 
analysis specifically on the unique concerns raised by longstanding, as 
opposed to ordinary, agency interpretations.  To this end, Table 3 below 
provides a list of factors that favor deference to longstanding agency 
interpretations in particular, as well as a list of factors that disfavor 
deference to such interpretations.  The list is intended only as a first stab at 
itemizing the relevant concerns, but this Article encourages courts to pay 
attention to the kinds of factors listed below when reviewing agency 
interpretations that have been in place for several years. 
Most of the factors in Table 3 reflect either the theoretical justifications 
for deference to longstanding legal rules discussed in Part II of this Article 
or the Casey factors for overruling a longstanding precedent.  The 
remaining factors, such as “irrational agency rigidity” and “interpretation 
causes particular hardship,” are intended to counterbalance the factors that 
favor deference.  For example, the “irrational agency rigidity” and “harmful 
effects become apparent over time” factors seek to balance the presumption 
that longstanding interpretations are practically workable:  if there is 
evidence that an agency has held on to an agency interpretation out of 
stubbornness or inflexibility, perhaps despite signs that the interpretation is 
not working, then that should counsel against deference to the agency’s 
interpretation.  Similarly, if a longstanding agency interpretation causes 
particular hardship to certain litigants—especially members of politically 
disadvantaged groups—or has harmful effects that do not become apparent 
 227. See Brief for Respondent, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011) 
(No. 09-291), 2010 WL 4232638, at *49–52. 
 228. See Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 841–43 & n.15 (9th Cir. 
2012). 
 229. See Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Brown, J., dissenting in part) (“The Agency Decision on Remand is not published or readily 
available to the public. . . .  As a result, the Agency Decision on Remand does not provide 
traditional rule-of-law values:  it is not publically knowable; it lacks any assurances of 
stability; and litigants cannot rely upon it when challenging contrary agency action in the 
future.”). 
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for several years, this too should counsel against deference to the 
interpretation. 
With these factors in mind, let us reconsider Rapanos v. United States, 
discussed in the Introduction and Part III.A.  The Army Corps of Engineers 
had for thirty years interpreted the CWA in a manner that counted John 
Rapanos’s wetlands as “navigable waters” subject to the agency’s 
jurisdiction.230  That interpretation had generated significant reliance by 
thirty-three states who had structured their own water pollution programs 
based on the understanding that wetlands like John Rapanos’s were 
protected waterways.231  The interpretation also seemed to have earned 
Congress’s affirmative approval, in that Congress had considered and 
rejected a proposal to limit the Army Corps’s regulatory jurisdiction after 
the agency adopted the regulation at issue.232  Further, the interpretation 
reflected the agency’s scientific policy judgment that the pollution of 
wetlands like those at issue would threaten the quality of adjacent navigable 
waters, even when separated by man-made dikes.233 
On the other hand, the Army Corps’s construction of the CWA also 
implicated some of the factors disfavoring deference to a longstanding 
interpretation.  As the plurality opinion noted, one study showed that the 
typical landowner had to spend tens of thousands of dollars to obtain a 
permit from the Army Corps if he wished to backfill a waterway that fell 
under the Corps’s jurisdiction.234  This could create particular hardship for 
some litigants, like John Rapanos.  Moreover, because the study identifying 
these costs was published in 2002, there may have been an argument that 
the harmful effects of the Army Corps’s interpretation did not become 
apparent until the interpretation had been in effect for twenty-plus years—
countering the workability presumption. 
Absent a coherent framework for evaluating longstanding agency 
interpretations, the plurality opinion in Rapanos focused on dictionary 
definitions, language canons, and substantive norms rather than on the 
above factors.  The opinion did mention the high costs of obtaining a 
permit, but it did so in the context of making a federalism argument against 
government regulations, rather than evaluating the workability of the 
agency’s longstanding interpretation.235  The dissenting opinion relied 
heavily on the longevity of the agency’s interpretation and on congressional 
acquiescence, but nowhere mentioned that thirty-three states had relied on 
 230. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723–24, 727–28 (2006) (citing 33 C.F.R. 
§ 328.3(a)(1)–(3), (5), (7); (c)). 
 231. See Brief of 33 States, supra note 160, at 3. 
 232. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 233. See Brief of U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs et al., supra note 175, at *25–28 (stating 
that pollution of wetlands like those at issue “will typically threaten the quality of those 
adjacent waters” even when separated “by man-made dikes or barriers, natural river berms, 
beach dunes and the like”). 
 234. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 721 (citing David Sunding & David Zilberman, The 
Economics of Environmental Regulation by Licensing:  An Assessment of Recent Changes to 
the Wetland Permitting Process, 42 NATURAL RES. J. 59, 74–76 (2002)). 
 235. Id. 
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the agency’s interpretation in crafting their own water pollution policies.236  
Moreover, the two opinions often seemed to be talking past each other, 
dismissing as unimportant the factors on which the opposing opinion relied.  
If federal courts were to adopt a presumption of correctness for 
longstanding agency interpretations, as this Article suggests, the deference 
analysis in Rapanos would have boiled down to evaluating whether the 
costs to individual landowners should trump the reliance interests of several 
states, the acquiescence of Congress, and the scientific judgment of the 
Army Corps of Engineers.  That is, the Court’s discussion would have 
focused on the practical consequences of upsetting the Army Corps’s 
established legal rule—weighing the costs of such a change against the 
benefits—rather than embarking on a dictionary-language-canon-
substantive-norm fest. 
Consider as another example the 2011 case, Astrue v. Capato,237 which 
raised the question whether posthumously conceived children are entitled to 
receive benefits under the Social Security Act (SSA).238  For seventy-one 
years, the Social Security Administration had interpreted the SSA to allow 
children to qualify for survivor benefits only if they were entitled to inherit 
from the deceased wage earner under state intestacy law.239  Most states’ 
intestacy laws, like the SSA, were written long before posthumous 
conception was possible, and thus did not allow for inheritance by children 
conceived after their parent’s death.  The Capatos, twin girls conceived 
through in vitro fertilization after their father died of cancer, challenged the 
agency’s longstanding construction.240  The Court rejected their challenge, 
upholding the agency’s reading.  In so doing, the Court took a very 
textualist approach, focusing on the technical interplay of various sections 
of the SSA.241  Nowhere did it mention that new technological 
developments unanticipated at the time the interpretation at issue was 
adopted (in a 1940 regulation)—that is, changed factual circumstances—
may have created reasons to question the agency’s approach in this 
particular application.  Indeed, the Court barely mentioned the longevity of 
the agency’s statutory interpretation at all.242 
Under this Article’s proposed presumption of correctness, the fact that 
the agency’s reading had been in effect for seventy-one years would have 
been the starting point for the Court’s deference analysis.  Moreover, the 
change in factual circumstances—that is, the technological developments 
that made posthumous conception possible decades after the agency 
 236. Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 237. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012). 
 238. Id. at 2025–26. 
 239. See 5 Fed. Reg. 1849, 1880 (May 23, 1940) (“A son or daughter (by blood) of a 
wage earner, who is the child of such wage earner or has the same status as a child, under 
applicable State law, is the child of such wage earner.” (citation omitted)); see also Brief for 
Petitioner, Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) (No. 11-159), 2011 WL 6937369, at *24 
(quoting 5 Fed. Reg. at 1880). 
 240. Astrue, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 241. Id. at 2029. 
 242. Id. at 2034. 
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interpretation was adopted—would have been discussed at length.  The 
Court likely would—and should—still have upheld the agency’s 
interpretation, perhaps based on an institutional competence argument that 
Congress or the Social Security Administration, rather than the courts, 
should be the one to decide whether children born through previously 
nonexistent technologies are entitled to federal benefits.  But the Court also 
might have considered whether the agency’s failure to update its 
interpretation to reflect new technological developments demonstrated an 
inattentiveness that justified judicial intervention.  Either way, judicial 
review of the agency’s longstanding interpretation would have looked 
significantly different, and would have focused more on the practical 
considerations—relative institutional competence, soundness, perhaps 
reliance interests—raised by changing a longstanding agency rule, rather 
than on traditional text-based statutory analysis. 
C.   When Agencies Change Longstanding Interpretations 
Finally, it is worth considering how federal courts should proceed when 
an agency seeks to abandon its own longstanding statutory interpretation.  I 
have already noted my general belief that courts should not apply a 
presumption of correctness to reject an agency-driven change to a 
longstanding interpretation.  But how, then, should courts proceed in their 
judicial review?  Should they uphold all agency-driven interpretive changes, 
or should they seek to scrutinize the agency’s reasons for making the 
change and decide whether to defer on a case-by-case basis? 
My view is that the latter is the better approach.  Specifically, I believe 
that courts confronting an agency-driven interpretive change should seek to 
determine whether the motivation for the change is purely political, or is 
based on an exercise of the agency’s policy expertise and judgment.  That 
is, courts should look for the presence of traditional factors that support 
changes in longstanding legal rules and seek to ascertain whether the 
agency’s interpretive switch is based on such factors.  For example, courts 
should consider (1) whether there have been any changes in legal or factual 
circumstances since the interpretation was rendered that justify an 
interpretive change;243 (2) whether the interpretation produces harmful 
effects that have only recently become apparent;244 (3) whether the 
interpretation has proved unsound or unworkable over time;245 and 
(4) whether the President is trumping congressional intent in changing the 
interpretation.246  They should then weigh such factors against the 
 243. See, e.g., Astrue, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (new technology makes posthumous conception 
possible raising new questions about Social Security survivor benefits); OfficeMax, Inc. v. 
United States, 428 F.3d 583, 598 (6th Cir. 2005) (new cellular service technology makes 
distance-based pricing irrelevant). 
 244. See Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957) (problems with 
employer’s safety equipment apparent after employee injured). 
 245. See Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 841–42 (2012) (noting 
reasons why rule forbidding compounding interest is unsound). 
 246. Cf. Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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theoretical assumptions that traditionally justify deference to longstanding 
precedents—i.e., the presence of (1) public or private reliance on the 
longstanding interpretation or (2) signs that Congress approves of the 
agency’s longstanding reading and that the agency is acting based on purely 
political grounds, in opposition to Congress. 
If an agency’s interpretive shift seems motivated purely by political 
concerns, then courts should apply the proposed presumption in favor of the 
longstanding construction.  But if there are experience, expertise, or cost-
benefit reasons supporting the agency’s interpretive shift, then federal 
courts should defer to the agency’s judgment. 
For an illustration of how these factors should work in practice, consider 
two examples, one hypothetical and one based on the facts of an actual 
case:  a recently elected conservative President pushes the EPA to change a 
thirty-year-old interpretation of the Clean Air Act (hypothetical).  
Conversely, a liberal President changes a thirty-year-old FDA interpretation 
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).  (Real case:  Under the 
Clinton Administration, the FDA attempted to reverse a sixty-year-old FDA 
reading that the FDCA did not give FDA authority to regulate tobacco 
products.247)  How should courts treat the longevity of the agency 
interpretation in each case? 
In the actual FDA case, many of the traditional factors supporting a shift 
in interpretation were present.  There were, for example, changed factual 
circumstances in that data that recently had become available demonstrating 
the addictive properties of nicotine (which affected the definition of 
“drug”), as had evidence showing that tobacco companies knew about these 
addictive effects but hid such data from the public.248  In addition, certain 
harmful effects of tobacco only recently had become apparent—including 
scientific data about the addictive properties of nicotine.249  Accordingly, 
there were factors beyond pure politics motivating the FDA’s reversal of its 
longstanding interpretation (though politics certainly played a role in the 
agency’s switch).  Conversely, there also was private reliance, by tobacco 
companies, on the FDA’s longstanding interpretation, as well as signs of 
congressional acquiescence in the FDA’s decades-long position that it 
lacked jurisdiction to regulate tobacco products.250  Moreover, Congress 
itself had regulated tobacco labeling and advertising in a series of separate 
statutes (public reliance).251  Given that there were good reasons beyond 
politics for the agency’s interpretive change, this Article’s proposed 
approach would have directed federal courts to defer to the agency and 
allow the change in statutory construction.  (This is not, ultimately, how the 
Supreme Court ruled; rather the Court, relying heavily on congressional 
 247. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125 (2000). 
 248. See id. at 188 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 144 (majority opinion). 
 251. Id. at 143–44. 
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acquiescence and public reliance arguments, rejected the agency’s changed 
construction at Chevron Step One.252) 
In the hypothetical situation where a conservative President seeks to 
change a longstanding environmental interpretation, courts likewise should 
consider whether new data has emerged that calls into doubt the original 
interpretation:  Has new evidence surfaced regarding whether X pollutant is 
dangerous to the public health?  Have the harmful effects of X pollutant 
only recently became apparent as, arguably, was the case with greenhouse 
gases?  Courts also should consider whether the agency’s original 
interpretation has proved unworkable to administer.  If there are experience- 
or expertise-based reasons supporting the agency’s new construction, then 
again, courts should defer to the agency’s judgment, even if political 
concerns also played a role in the decision to change interpretations and 
even if regulated parties have relied on the agency’s previous interpretation, 
or Congress has acquiesced in it.  In short, this Article encourages federal 
courts to develop a consistent set of factors that both support and weigh 
against deference to an agency-driven change in a longstanding 
interpretation (like the factors listed in Table 3 favoring and disfavoring 
deference to a longstanding agency interpretation challenged by a litigant).  
Ultimately, where an agency seeks to change its own longstanding 
interpretation, courts should seek to determine whether the agency’s 
motivation is purely political or whether one or more factors justifying 
interpretive change is present.  Unless a court concludes that the agency 
was driven by purely political concerns—that is, unless none of the factors 
justifying change is present—the court should defer to the agency’s new 
interpretation. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the prevailing wisdom that longstanding agency statutory 
interpretations should receive heightened judicial deference, courts and 
scholars lack a coherent framework for how that deference should work.  
As a result, federal courts’ approach to the judicial review of longstanding 
agency interpretations is surprisingly inconsistent and theoretically chaotic.  
This Article has aimed to fill the doctrinal and theoretical void by 
(1) shedding light on federal courts’ incoherent approach to the judicial 
review of longstanding agency interpretations and (2) arguing that 
longstanding agency interpretations of statutes should be entitled to some 
precedential effect, or presumption of correctness, upon judicial review.  At 
a minimum, I hope to have convinced the reader that it is curious that the 
federal courts have treated longstanding agency interpretations so 
differently from longstanding judicial interpretations of statutes and 
longstanding executive branch practices in the constitutional context—and 
that courts should give greater weight than they currently do to an agency 
 252. Id. 
 
1880 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
interpretation’s longevity (and the reliance interests and executive and 
legislative branch judgment reflected therein) on judicial review. 
 
 
Table 1:  Longstanding Interpretation Cases Reviewed 
U.S. Supreme Court 
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817 (2013) 
Statute Medicare Act (HHS) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 39 years (1974–2013) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 7 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Systematic problem with government 
calculations 
Reliance Interests? Yes (reenacted six times) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) 
Statute 
Social Security Act (Social Security 
Administration) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 71 years (1940–2011) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 13 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Tech’l advances (posthumous 
conception) give rise to new benefits 
claims 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (amendment noted in brief) 
Outcome Upheld 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011) 
Statute 
Fair Labor Standard Act (Dep’t of Labor 
and EEOC) 
Form 
Compliance Manual (EEOC); 
Enforcement Action (Dep’t of Labor) 
Longevity in Years 40 years (1961–2011) 
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No. of Presidential Administrations 10 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Employer defense 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011) 
Statute Title VII (EEOC) 
Form Compliance Manual 
Longevity in Years 23 years (1998–2011) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 3 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Employer defense; Harmful effects 
become apparent 
Reliance Interests? 
No (employer brief argues agency 
interpretation is out of step with case 
law) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome 
Ignored (by majority); Concurring 
opinion mentions 
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009) 
Statute Clean Water Act (EPA) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 32 years (1977–2009) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 6 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
New EPA regulation relies on long-
standing agency position 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (reenacted, acquiescence cited in 
Entergy Brief) 
Outcome Upheld 
Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81 (2007) 
Statute 
Improving America’s Schools Act (Dep’t 
of Educ.) 
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Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 31 years (1976–2007) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 6 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Benefit reduced; Harmful effects become 
apparent 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (at time of 1994 amendment, 
Congress did not mention reversing then-
18 year old regulation) 
Outcome Upheld 
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) 
Statute 
Clean Water Act (Army Corps of 
Engineers) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 29 years (1977–2006) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 5 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Government enforcement- hardship to 
particular litigant; Private property 
protection; Invades local power over land 
use planning 
Reliance Interests? Yes, by states 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes 
Outcome Rejected 
Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228 (2005) 
Statute 
Age Discrimination Employment Act 
(ADEA) (EEOC) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 24 years (1981–2005) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Employer defense 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (Congress amended statute without 
disturbing agency’s construction) 
Outcome Upheld 
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Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA, 540 U.S. 461 (2004) 
Statute Clean Air Act (EPA) 
Form Adjudication Order 
Longevity in Years 21 years (1983–2004) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Federalism concerns (state issued a 
permit which EPA) 
Reliance Interests? 
Arguably yes, cutting against agency 
interpretation (reliance that state agencies 
could make binding decision) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) 
Statute Social Security Act (HHS) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 
45 years (1957–2002); or at least 20 
(1982–2002) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 10; or at least 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Benefit withheld (denial of individual 
benefits) 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (reenacted) 
Outcome Upheld 
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999)  
*Superseded by statute 
Statute 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
(EEOC) 
Form Interpretive Rule 
Longevity in Years 8 years (1991–1999) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 2 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Employer defense (calls agency reading 
an “expansion”) 
Reliance Interests? No 
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Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Rejected 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998) 
Statute 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) / Rehabilitation Act 
(HEW) 
Form OLC opinion 
Longevity in Years 21 years (1977–1998) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Employer defense 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes 
Outcome Upheld 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) 
Statute 
Endangered Species Act (Dep’t of 
Interior) 
Form n/a 
Longevity in Years 20 years (1975–1995) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 5 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Government enforcement (hardship to 
particular litigant); Protection of private 
property rights 
Reliance Interests? 
No (although implicit argument about 
reliance on ability to use private land) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes 
Outcome Upheld 
Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) 
Statute Securities Exchange Act (SEC) 
Form Agency Enforcement Actions 
Longevity in Years At least 40 years (1946–1994) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 10 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Unclear 
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Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (on judicial interpretations as well as 
agency interpretation) 
Outcome Rejected 
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) 
Statute Veteran’s Benefits Statute (VA) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 64 years (1930–1994) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 13 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Gov’t denial of benefits 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Rejected 
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (superseded by statute) 
Statute Title VII (EEOC & DOJ) 
Form Letter and hearing testimony 
Longevity in Years 16 years (1975–1991) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Employer defense 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Rejected 
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989) (superseded by statute) 
Statute 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) (EEOC) 
Form 
Interpretive guidelines, later codified as 
regulations 
Longevity in Years 20 years (1969–1989) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4–5 
Change in Party? No 
Reason for Challenge Employer defense 
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Reliance Interests? 
Yes (Betts argues employers have relied 
on regulations) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (Congress amended other regulations 
but not disability regulations) 
Outcome Rejected 
K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988) 
Statute Tariff Act (Customs Service) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 
52 years (1936–1988) common control 
regulation; 37 years (1951–1988) 
authorized use regulation 
No. of Presidential Administrations 8 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Trademark holders seek injunction 
against agency regulation 
Reliance Interests? 
Yes (Kmart brief argues that “substantial 
domestic industry has relied”) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (ratification argued extensively in 
Kmart brief) 
Outcome 
Upheld (common control interpretation); 
rejected (authorized-use exception) 
NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112 (1987) 
Statute NLRA (Dep’t of Labor) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 39 years (1948–1987) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 8 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Litigant seeks day in court 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986) 
Statute Commodities Exchange Act (CFTC) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 10 years (1976–1986) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 3 
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Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Litigant seeks day in court 
Reliance Interests? 
Maybe (briefs claim that counter-claims 
are filed in many cases) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (Congress twice amended without 
overruling and once explicitly affirmed 
interpretation) 
Outcome Upheld 
Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) 
Statute Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDA) 
Form 
Trade correspondence (1938); Fed. Reg. 
statement (1974); regulation (1977) 
Longevity in Years 48 years (1938–1986) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 9 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Unclear 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (revisited exact provision and made 
other changes) 
Outcome Upheld 
W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) 
Statute 
Age Discrimination Employment Act 
(ADEA) (DoL, later EEOC) 
Longevity in Years 17 years (1968–1985) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 5 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Employer defense 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Ignored (Upheld) 
FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426 (1986) 
Statute FDIC Act (FDIC) 
Form 
Statement by agency officials at meeting 
with bank officials 
Longevity in Years 
53 years (1933–1986); statement by 
agency officials at meeting with bank 
officials 
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No. of Presidential Administrations 9 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Private party wants government benefit 
Reliance Interests? 
Yes (Congress sand banking industry, 
referenced in FDIC brief) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (including reenactment) 
Outcome Upheld 
Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) 
Statute Fair Labor Standard Act (FLSA) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 15 years (1970–1985) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Employer defense 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 461 U.S. 624 (1983) 
Statute Compensation Act (Dep’t of Labor) 
Form 
Litigation brief and letters filed in legal 
cases; program memorandum 
Longevity in Years 15 years (1968–1983) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 5 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Family of deceased employee seeks to 
maximize government benefits 
Reliance Interests? Yes 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (amended) 
Outcome Upheld 
N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) 
Statute 
Title IX (Dep’t Health, Educ., and 
Welfare) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 8 year (1974–1982) 
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No. of Presidential Administrations 3–4 (Nixon resigned in August) 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Employer defense (argue that HEW has 
no jurisdiction to regulate employment 
practices) 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (disapproval resolution attempted 
but failed, also no changes made when 
statute amended the next year) 
Outcome Upheld 
United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555 (1982) 
Statute 
Federal Pay Statute (Civil Service 
Comm’n) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 13 years (1969–1982) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Federal employees seek to maximize 
statutory wage increase with promotion 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (amended in 1972, no change) 
Outcome Upheld 
FEC v. Democratic Senate Campaign Comm’n, 454 U.S. 27 (1981) 
Statute Federal Election Campaign Act (FEC) 
Form Advisory opinion; regulation (1977) 
Longevity in Years 5 years (1976–1981) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 3 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Harmful consequences of construction 
become apparent 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (amended with knowledge of 
agency’s construction, no changes made) 
Outcome 
Upheld (agency consistency noted, not 
longevity) 
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois & Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) 
Statute 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(EPA (and later DOJ)) 
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Form Position taken in brief 
Longevity in Years 9 years (1972–1981) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
One state suing another—cast as 
federalism issue—federal law ousting 
state statutory and common law 
Reliance Interests? 
Reliance argued in opposite direction by 
majority 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (Congress amended statute in 1977, 
considered issue and expressed support 
for position taken by agency, that federal 
common law survives) 
Outcome Rejected 
NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) 
Statute 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 
(Dep’t of Labor and NLRB) 
Form Adjudication orders 
Longevity in Years 41 years (1940–1981) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 9 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Employer defense  
Reliance Interests? 
No (but discussion about practical 
workability and that interpretation has 
stood test of 37 years’ experience) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (even talks about NLRB reports 
bringing practice to Congress’s attention) 
Outcome 
Upheld (a lot of discussion in both sides’ 
briefs about consistency of agency 
construction) 
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) 
Statute 
Securities Exchange Act; Securities Act 
(SEC) 
Form Litigation position 
Longevity in Years 5 years (1975–1980) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 2 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Defense by company in enforcement 
action 
Reliance Interests? No 
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Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (amended in 1975 and 1977 did not 
upset Commission interpretation) 
Outcome Rejected 
SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978) 
Statute Securities Exchange Act (SEC) 
Form Summary Orders 
Longevity in Years 34 years (1944–1978) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 8 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Egregious enforcement 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (during reenactment congressional 
committee expressly accepted 
interpretation but Court said not good 
enough) 
Outcome Rejected 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46 (1977) 
Statute Securities Exchange Act (SEC) 
Form Adjudication orders 
Longevity in Years 
28 years 
(1949–1977) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 7 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Investors challenge agency approval of 
transaction that favors closed-end 
affiliate of public company (bias/  
capture) 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975) 
Statute 
Investment Company Act 
(SEC’s GC) 
Form 
Response to inquiry, printed in Fed. Reg; 
SEC adjudication order (1946) 
Longevity in Years 
34 years (1941–1975); 29 years 
(1946–1979) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 7 
Change in Party? Yes 
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Reason for Challenge 
Investors and United States seek 
expansive application of antitrust laws 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. Federal Power Comm’n, 420 U.S. 395 (1975) 
Statute 
Federal Power Act (Fed. Power 
Comm’n) 
Form Agency’s first annual report to Congress 
Longevity in Years 54 years (1921–1975) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 10 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Tribe argues that new technological 
development unforeseen when statute 
enacted fits within statute’s regulatory 
scheme 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (no change when Act amended or 
later reenacted as part of new statute) 
Outcome Upheld 
Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974) 
Statute Immigration and Nationality Act (DOJ) 
Form DOJ general order 
Longevity in Years 47 years (1927–1974) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 9 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Farm workers and collective bargaining 
agents seek reading favoring domestic 
workers 
Reliance Interests? 
Yes (dislocation and hardship for daily 
workers on either side of the border) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (no change, and S. Rep. acceptance 
when Act revisited); Separation of 
powers—Congress must be the one to 
change this practice 
Outcome Upheld 
Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957) 
Statute Safety Appliance Act (ICC) 
Form ICC order 
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Longevity in Years 46 years (1911–1957) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 8 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Harmful effects become apparent; 
Alleges that employer equipment does 
not meet statute’s safety requirements 
Reliance Interests? 
No (but dissent cites practical concerns 
about safety raised in ICC brief) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome 
Rejected (Court says no clearly 
expressed agency position) 
Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Emp’t Relations 
Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) 
Statute 
NLRA and Labor Management Act 
(NLRB) 
Form NLRB adjudication order 
Longevity in Years 11 years (1938–1949) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 2 
Change in Party? No 
Reason for Challenge 
Union engages in new tactics, WI state 
board seeks to enjoin them, Union claims 
protection under NLRA and LMA 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Rejected (and later overturned by Court) 
Federal Courts of Appeals 
Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc.,  697 F.3d 820 (2012) 
Statute 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act 
Form Litigation position 
Longevity in Years 23 years (1989–2012) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Injured employee seeks compound 
interest rather than simple interest 
Reliance Interests? No (references changed circum-stances) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Rejected 
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Bhd. of R.R. Signalmen v. Surface Transp. Bd., 638 F.3d 807 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
Statute 
Interstate Commerce Commission 
Termination Act (ICC) 
Form ICC adjudication order 
Longevity in Years 19 (1991–2010) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
New development (Unions want Mass. 
DOT purchase of RR lines to be subject 
to STB approval) 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland, 661 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2011) 
Statute National Labor Relations Act (NLRB) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 64 (1947–2011) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 12 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
New situation (NLRB usually handles 
petitions for injunctions against 
employers, but delegated authority to its 
general counsel) 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes 
Outcome Upheld 
Frankl v. HTH Corp., 650 F.3d 1334 (9th Cir. 2011) 
Statute National Labor Relations Act (NLRB) 
Form Memorandum published in Fed. Reg. 
Longevity in Years 64 years (1947–2011) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 12 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge New situarion 
Reliance Interest? No 
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Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes 
Outcome Upheld 
Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
Statute Great Lakes Pilotage Act (Coast Guard) 
Form Agency adjudication order on remand 
Longevity in Years 
36 years 
(1975-2011) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 7 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Pilot wants agency authority construed 
narrowly, so no power to terminate his 
position for the season 
Reliance Interests? 
No (but some mention that interpretation 
reflects agency advice to states for  years 
and dissent argues no visibility) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009) 
Statute Medicaid Act (HHS) 
Form Informal rule 
Longevity in Years 15 years (1994–2009) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 3 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Claimant seeking to maximize benefits 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Se. Ala. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 572 F.3d 912 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
Statute Medicare Statute (HHS) 
Form Interim/final rule; regulation 
Longevity in Years 26 years (1983–2009) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 5 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Hospitals in three southern states 
challenge HHS formula for calculating 
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“hospital costs” 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome 
Rejected (remand for better explanation, 
long-standing rule including postage in 
costs rejected) 
Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 557 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2009) 
Statute OSH Act (OSHA) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 35 years (1974-2009) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 7 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Challenge to new OSHA reg that follows 
long-standing practice re permissive 
exposure levels for airborne toxins 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2008) 
Statute Medicare statute (HHS) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 42 years (1966–2008) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 9 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Changed factual circum-stances / 
plaintiffs seek more generous benefits 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (not in opinion, but in agency’s brief 
and in district court opinion) 
Outcome Upheld 
Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, (9th Cir. 2009)  
Statute Immigration and Nationality Act 
Form BIA decision 
Longevity in Years 69 years (1940–2009) 
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No. of Presidential Administrations 13 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Alien seeking favorable reading of INA 
to allow discretionary waiver of 
deportation 
Reliance Interests? Yes (public reliance, noted in dissent) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (Congress amended in 1952 without 
changing) 
Outcome 
Rejected (majority ignores, concurrence 
and dissent point out) 
Garcia v. Brockway, 526 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2008) 
Statute Fair Housing Act (HUD) 
Form Handbook/manual 
Longevity in Years 10–13 years (1995/98– 2008) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 2 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Plaintiffs seek equitable tolling of FHA 
statute of limitations 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome 
Rejected (majority ignores longevity, 
dissent points it out) 
Groff v. United States, 493 F.3d 1343 (7th Cir. 2007) 
Statute Public Safety Officers’ Benefits Act 
Form 
BIA adjudication order codified in a BIA 
document 
Longevity in Years 27 years (1980–2007) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 5 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Plaintiffs seeks to qualify for government 
benefits 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan, 508 F.3d 1243 (9th Cir. 2007) 
Statute 
Indian Health Care Improvement Act 
(HCFA) 
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Form Memorandum 
Longevity in Years 31 years (1976–2007) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 6 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
States seek greater reimbursement from 
federal government under Medicaid 
reimbursement system 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Council Tree Comnc’ns v. F.C.C., 503 F.3d 284 (3d Cir. 2007) 
Statute Communications Act (FCC) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 26 years (1981–2007) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Plaintiff seeks to change competitive 
bidding regulations 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (express approval of regulations 
during amendment) 
Outcome Upheld 
Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 438 (1st Cir. 2007) 
Statute Real ID Act 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 55 years (1952–2007) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 11 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
New statute/ legal development, alien 
seeks to take advantage and reopen 
removal proceedings 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (revisited) 
Outcome Upheld 
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Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F.3d 615 (3d Cir. 2006) 
Statute 
Longshore and Harbor Workers’ 
Compensation Act 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 
Over 20 years (opinion does not give 
exact dates) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Employer seeks to pay fewer benefits 
than ordered by Benefits Review Board 
Reliance Interests? 
No (notes only two challenges in 20 
years as sign of consensus and practical 
workability) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (amended statute in past, but no 
change to relevant part) 
Outcome Upheld 
OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583 (6th Cir. 2005) 
Statute Tax code (IRS) 
Form Revenue ruling 
Longevity in Years 26 years (1979–2005) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 5 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
New technological developments (e.g., 
cell service make long-distance less 
relevant) 
Reliance Interests? 
Yes (dissent says excise tax already 
collected, and Congress took tax into 
account when making revenue and 
budget decisions) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (Reenacted) 
Outcome 
Rejected (citing new technological 
developments and facts that revenue 
ruling is unusual) 
Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2004) 
Statute Tax code (IRS) 
Form Revenue ruling 
Longevity in Years 35 years (1969–2004) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 7 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Export/duty-free shop seeks refund of 
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excise taxes paid 
Reliance Interests? 
No (notes IRS’s failure to  change ruling 
as sign of its soundness) 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Sec’y of Labor v. Excel Mining, 334 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2003) 
Statute Federal Mine Safety and Health Act 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 28 years (1975-2003) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 5 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Company defense to Secretary of Labor’s 
issuance of citations 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (brief notes provision reenacted after 
the practice was in place for two years) 
Outcome Upheld 
United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 345 F.3d 866 (11th Cir. 2003) 
Statute Medical Care Recovery Act 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 14–19 years (1984/89–2003) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 3–4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Defense to government action 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002) 
Statute Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (FTC) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 27 years (1975– 2002) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 6 
Change in Party? Yes 
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Reason for Challenge 
Defendants seek to compel arbitration, 
reject FTC interpretation that statute 
precludes 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Rejected 
United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp., 200 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 1999) 
Statute CERCLA 
Form 
Guidance document in EPA 
memorandum 
Longevity in Years 9 years (1990–1999) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 2 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Government enforcement of cleanup and 
payment of cleanup costs, company 
resists 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence No 
Outcome Upheld 
Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., v. EPA, 118 F.3d 1467 (11th Cir. 1997) 
Statute Safe Drinking Water Act (EPA) 
Form Order denying petition for review 
Longevity in Years 17 years (1980–1997) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Foundation tries to get EPA to 
regulate/prohibit hydraulic fracturing 
activities 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (reenacted without change) 
Outcome Rejected 
Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1992) 
Statute Food Drug and Cosmetics Act 
Form 
HEW interpretation printed in 
Congressional Record 
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Longevity in Years 34 years (1958–1992) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 8 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
EPA attempt to change long-standing 
interpretation for more practical, 
workable one 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (repeated reenactment without 
change) 
Outcome Upheld 
Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1991) 
Statute Securities Act 
Form 
General counsel’s testimony at 
congressional hearings 
Longevity in Years 50 years (1941–1991) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 10 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
Employees seek to have employer 
benefits plan invalidated under Securities 
Acts 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (consideration and rejection of 
legislation, SEC testimony reiterated 
three additional times) 
Outcome Upheld 
Burton v. Derwinski, 933 F.2d 988 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
Statute Veterans’ Benefits Statute (VA) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 8 years (1983–1991) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 2 
Change in Party? No 
Reason for Challenge 
Claimant seeking jurisdiction before 
Court of Veterans Appeals 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes (reenacted) 
Outcome Upheld 
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Anderson Shipping Co. v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1988) 
Statute Clean Air Act (EPA) 
Form Regulation 
Longevity in Years 18 years (1970–1988) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 4 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge 
New regulations that follow longstanding 
EPA interpretation 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence Yes 
Outcome Upheld 
Int’l Union, UAW v. Brock, 816 F.2d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
Statute Veterans’ Act 
Form Policy handbook 
Longevity in Years 12 years (1975–1987) 
No. of Presidential Administrations 3 
Change in Party? Yes 
Reason for Challenge Claimants seeking government benefits 
Reliance Interests? No 
Mention of Legislative Acquiescence 
Yes (secretary argues that Congress 
didn’t try to change policy until 1981) 
Outcome Rejected 
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Table 2:  Reasons Motivating Litigant Challenge 
To Longstanding Agency Interpretation 
Changed Factual/Legal Developments 
1 Astrue v. Caputo (technology) Unclear 
2 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless (law) Ignored/Upheld 
3 Chemehuevi Tribe v. FPC (technology) Upheld 
4 Int’l Union UAW v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd. (facts) Rejected 
5 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. (facts) Upheld 
6 Estate of Landers v. Leavitt (facts) Upheld 
7 Pena-Muriel v. Gonzales (law) Upheld 
8 OfficeMax v. United States (technology) Rejected 
Employer Defense to Claim of Statutory Violation 
1 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless Ignored/Upheld 
2 Smith v. City of Jackson, Miss. Upheld 
3 Sutton v. United Air Lines Rejected 
4 Bragdon v. Abbott Upheld 
5 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. Rejected 
6 Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts Rejected 
7 W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell Ignored/Upheld 
8 Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor Upheld 
9 N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell Upheld 
10 NLRB v. Hendricks Cnty. Rural Elec. Membership Upheld 
11 Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto Upheld 
12 Sec’y of Labor v. Excel Mining Rejected 
Resistance to Agency Enforcement 
1 Rapanos v. United States Rejected 
2 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. Upheld 
3 Aaron v. SEC Rejected 
4 SEC v. Sloan Rejected 
5 United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc. Upheld 
6 United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp. Upheld 
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Attempt to Obtain/Increase Government Benefit 
1 Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ. Upheld 
2 Barnhart v. Walton Upheld 
3 Brown v. Gardner Rejected 
4 FDIC v. Phila. Gear Corp. Upheld 
5 
Morrison-Knudsen Constr. Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 
Compensation Programs 
Upheld 
6 United States v. Clark Upheld 
7 Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc. Rejected 
8 Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar Upheld 
9 Estate of Landers v. Leavitt Upheld 
10 Abebe v. Mukasey Ignored/Reject 
11 Groff v. United States Upheld 
12 Int’l Union, UAW v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd. Rejected 
Challenge to Agency Authority/Claim for Availability of Judicial Review 
1 
NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union 
Local 23 
Upheld 
2 CFTC v. Schor Upheld 
3 Frankl v. HTH Corp. Upheld 
4 Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Upheld 
5 Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes Rejected 
6 Les v. Reilly Upheld 
7 Burton v. Derwinski Upheld 
New Regulation Relying on Longstanding Agency Position 
1 Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc. Upheld 
2 Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Dep’t of Labor Upheld 
3 Anderson Shipping Co. v. EPA Upheld 
Particular Hardship to Litigant 
1 Rapanos v. United States Rejected 
2 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. Upheld 
3 Ramos-Barrientos v. Bland Partial/Upheld 
1906 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Private Property Protection 
1 Rapanos v. United States Rejected 
2 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or. Upheld 
3 Aaron v. SEC Rejected 
4 SEC v. Sloan Rejected 
5 United States v. Baxter Int’l, Inc. Upheld 
6 United States v. Occidental Chemical Corp. Upheld 
Federalism Concerns 
1 Rapanos v. United States Rejected 
2 Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. EPA Upheld 
3 City of Milwau-kee v. Ill. & Mich. Rejected 
Medicare Reimbursement 
1 Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. Upheld 
2 Se. Ala. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius Rejected 
3 Health Care Cost Containment Sys. v. McClellan Upheld 
Miscellaneous 
1 Balt. & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson Rejected 
2 FEC v. Democratic Senate Campaign Comm’n Upheld 
3 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins Upheld 
4 United States v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. Upheld 
5 Saxbe v. Bustos Upheld 
6 Council Tree Commc’ns v. FCC Upheld 
7 Bhd. of R.R. Signalmen v. Surface Transp. Bd. Upheld 
8 Ammex, Inc. v. United States Upheld 
9 Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., v. EPA Rejected 
10 Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight Upheld 
11 Garcia v. Brockway Ignored/Reject 
Unclear 
1 Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. Upheld 
2 Chemical Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council Upheld 
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 1. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 76 & n.29 (1974); Brief for Petitioner, FDIC 
v. Philadelphia Gear Corp, 476 U.S. 426 (1986) (No. 84-1972), 1985 WL 670115, at *27–
30. 
 2. See OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 598 (6th Cir. 2005) (court 
rejects longstanding interpretation where new cellular service technology makes distance-
based pricing irrelevant). 
 3. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700–01 
(1995) (subsequent amendment shows congressional approval of agency’s reading); CFTC 
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1986). 
 4. See Price v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., Inc., 697 F.3d 820, 841–42 (2012) (noting 
that case law has moved away from a rule forbidding compounding interest). 
 5. See Ammex, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.3d 530, 535 (6th Cir. 2004) (IRS’s 
adherence to interpretation for thirty years shows interpretation’s soundness). 
 6. See Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 353 U.S. 325 (1957) (injury to employee 
highlights problems with employer safety equipment). 
 7. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 79 (1974) (Congress should be the one to change 
interpretation). 
 8. See Astrue v. Capato, 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012) (agency applies old regulations to 
children born through new technologies enabling posthumous conception). 
 9. See Menkes v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 637 F.3d 319, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Brown, J., dissenting) (noting that agency decision was not published or available to the 
public). 
 10. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“unfairness to the point of financial ruin”). 
Table 3:  Factors Favoring and Disfavoring Deference 
Factors Favoring Deference Factors Disfavoring Deference 
Reliance Interests1 Changed Factual Circumstances2 
Legislative Acquiescence3 Changes in the Surrounding Law4 
Presumed Soundness/ 
Practical Workability5 
Harmful or Adverse Effects of 
Interpretation Become Apparent6 
Separation of Powers/ 
Institutional Competence of Agency 
and Congress vs. Courts7 
Irrational Agency Rigidity8 
 Lack of Visibility for Interpretation9 
 Interpretation Causes Particular Hardship in Certain Applications10 
 
